Title:	Styles of representation, policy congruence and expectations about democracy: Parties and party voters

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold. First I examine how different styles of representation emphasised within parties explain how well their voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Second I examine whether party voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled when policy congruence between parties and their voters is high. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within parties who are partisans, trustees or delegates. Policy congruence is defined as how close parties are to their voters on the left right scale. For voters expectations about democracy I use questions from the European Social Survey, round 6. There respondents were asked first about how important various factors are for democracy (such as free and fair elections) and next about the status of those same factors in their respective country. The distance between what is important for democracy and the status reflects how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Very early and preliminary findings indicate that the more the partisan style is emphasised within parties, the better voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. For the role of delegates the relation is reverse, the more that style is emphasised the worse are voters expectation about democracy fulfilled, while the style trustees does not seem to have an impact. Furthermore, the more policy congruence between parties and party voters, the better are voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

Introduction

This paper combines two strands in the literature to explain how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. First, I make use of studies about the nature and outcome of representation (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005) where my focus is on political parties. The nature of representation is about the relationship between representatives and the represented, here referred to as styles of representation. Outcome of representation is about its consequences, often studied as responsiveness or policy congruence between representatives and the represented. Second, I connect this with the literature on public opinion, focusing on how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. The main question is whether and how the different styles of representations (nature of representation) emphasised within parties and policy congruence with their voters (outcome of representation) explain how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Styles of representations emphasised within parties are classified as the proportion of parties' representatives who are partisans, trustees or delegates. Policy congruence is defined as how close parties are to their voters on the left-right scale. How well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled is captured by the distance between their expectations about democracy and their evaluations about its status in their respective country. I combine parties and party voters in pairs hereafter referred to as party dyads.

The basic idea of representative democracy is quite simple; the role of the state is to interpret and execute the will of the public. However exactly how this "will of the public" is carried out is marked with ambiguities and there is a long way between the idea of democracy and the quality of its implementation. Representation in modern democracies is about a collective (e.g. a legislature or a party) representing a collective (e.g. all voters or party voters). In the early days of representative democracy in Western countries representation was carried out through individual mandates. In the late 19th and former half of the 20th century parties were formed and they soon became the major actors in representing their voters (Boix 2007, Mair 2006). At the forefront is that parties are made up of individuals but at the same time parties set limits to its members actions, specifically those who are representatives for the party (Aldrich 2011, Aldrich 1995).

One of the distinguishing features of representative democracy is that voters, as on the demand side of democracy, choose their representatives as the supply side of democracy (Castiglione and Warren 2006). It is common that the supply side of representation is studied separately from its demand side. To this there are a few exceptions, commonly focusing on

policy congruence between parties and voters (e.g. Belchior 2013, Önnudóttir 2013, Holmberg 2011, Welzel and Klingeman 2011). This paper combines the demand and supply side of representation by analysing how different party characteristic explain how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. This is based on that political parties are key actors in the implementation of representation. For that reason it is meaningful to examine the link between the structure and make-up of parties and their voters' expectations about democracy. To sum up, the main question is whether party characteristics, here focusing on styles of representation and policy congruence between parties and party voters, has consequences for party voters subjective evaluation about democracy – measured as how well their expectations about democracy are met.

The demand and supply sides of representation

Demand side

Baviskar and Malone (2004) establish that different groups of voters have different understandings and expectations about democracy. However there are a few commonalities including elections and political parties. For the purpose of this paper it is of key importance that the main focus is in how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled, and to a much lesser extent on the different aspects of voters' understanding of it.

The literature suggests a decrease in political support, commonly measured as satisfaction with how democracy works and a decline in political trust (e.g. Anderson 2002, Dalton 2008). For these, different explanations and consequences have been examined. On the micro level the main explanatory factors have been for example the cognitive mobilisation of citizens (Dalton 2008), perceived policy performance of the political system (Önnudóttir and Harðarson 2011), perceptions of corruption (Stokemer and Sundstrøm 2013) and the winners or losers of the election (Holmberg 1999, Anderson and Guillory 1997). The macro level perspective has focused on the institutional effectiveness of the political system (Norris 2011), level of corruption (Kubbe 2013, Stokemer and Sundstrøm 2013) and age of democracy (Norris 2011). The consequences of decreasing political support are debated as well. Some authors argue that trust is crucial for the political system to function effectively (e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001) and underline the importance of political support for the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001, Diamond 1999). Others have argued that decreasing political support is a reflection of a more informed and politically

sophisticated citizens who hold their politicians to a higher standard, which should preferably lead to a more responsive and accountable political system (e.g. Dalton 2008).

If it is commonly understood that low levels of political support are important for representative democracy to function effectively and that political parties are one of the main actors in representative democracy, it is surprising that there seem to be very limited existence of studies that examine how those two phenomena are linked (political support and political parties). An additional shortcoming is that satisfaction with democracy and political trust do not capture peoples' understanding and expectations about democracy. There have been numerous studies on political support where a distinction is made between different levels of support, such as support for the regime, the principles, performance, institutions and actors (Norris 1999). These can be understood as a status of support and still tell little about which yardstick(s) people use to evaluate democracy. It can be assumed that peoples' expectations about democracy play a vital role explaining their support for democracy in their respective countries. Based on that political parties are the major actors in modern democracies, specifically in Europe (Dalton 1985) it is reasonable to assume that voters' expectations about democracy and how well those expectations are met are linked to both how representation is carried out and the different structure of political parties in their respective country.

Supply side

Since the early days of representative studies a distinction between the trustee and delegate style of representation has been quite dominant (see for example Wahlke et al. 1962, Eulau and Karps 1977, Andeweg 2012). The trustee style refers to that elected representatives use their own judgement when taking decisions as elected representatives. The delegate style assumes that the representative should follow the will of the voters regardless of their own opinions. In Converse and Pierce's (1986) study on representation in France they add the partisan style as the third style. Their argument is that a threefold distinction between partisans, trustees and delegates is closer to capturing a reality of representation compared to using only the two former ones. Studies of these kinds commonly focus on individual representatives and how different party characteristics and settings of the electoral system explain representatives' role-perception and behaviour as elected representatives. Because of the apparent limited impact of styles of representation on representatives' behaviour, studies on those have been scarce since the 1980s, but are now making their way back to the academic agenda (e.g. Blomgren and Rozemberg 2012a). A step forward is to recognise

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parties' role in shaping and promoting different style of representation, to acknowledge that representatives take on different styles under different circumstances, and there can be different factors and motivations underlying each style.

In the midst of numerous roles discussed in the literature such as the trustee, delegate and partisan styles, Searing's (1994) motivational roles, policy representation (Thomassen and Esaiasson 2006), Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) propose a useful distinction between legislative roles and representative roles. The former focuses on MPs work in the parliament and the latter on how and whom to represent. This distinction acknowledges different role-perceptions under different circumstances and clarifies what kinds of roles are analysed, what explains them and what are their consequences for representation. Strøm (2012) classifies different roles representatives take on as strategies to help them reach their goals, whether those are (re-)election, (re-)selection as candidates or to gain/maintain a party office. In Strøm's rational approach representatives have certain preferences for an outcome, but their means to realize them are conditioned by the institutions in which they operate. The two most obvious factors that condition their means to reach their goals are the settings of the electoral system and their parties' control over nomination and over other career paths for and within the party.

Zittel (2012) finds that the setting of the electoral system determines candidates' role-perception, with them to be more prone to emphasise a partisan style the less chance they have for winning a single-seat district. Wessels and Giebler (2011) reach a similar conclusion and also find a party socialisation effect, with longer party membership resulting in a greater likelihood of candidates to adopt a partisan style. Önnudóttir (2013) shows that parties' characteristics do explain which styles of representation are emphasised within parties. She finds that the more control parties have over nomination and party socialisation is followed by a higher proportion of partisans within parties. Parties' control over nomination also increases the proportion of delegates, but for trustees the relation is reverse. The less control parties have over nomination along with a higher frequency of representation in government the more likely it is that the parties do incorporate a high proportion of trustees.

Demand and supply sides of democracy
The discussion about parties and representatives' styles is closely linked to what democracy is about, both in normative terms (how it ought to be) and in practice (how it is) (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012). The question here is whether different styles of representation within parties matter for how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled – that is

whether it depends on the nature of representation. Furthermore I examine whether policy congruence as the outcome of representation, commonly regarded as a link between the demand side and supply side of democracy (Welzel and Klingeman 2011), does explain how well voters' expectations about democracy are met. For the latter there are two reasons. First is to examine whether congruence between parties and party voters' policy preferences explains how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled; that is if voters are close to their party on policy are their expectations about democracy better fulfilled? Second is to control for a possible bias in the effect of styles of representation on democratic expectations, as it has been shown that parties with a high proportion of trustees are closer to their voters on policy compared to those with a high proportion of partisans and delegates (Önnudóttir 2013). Before moving on to further explaining the possible link between policy congruence and expectations about democracy I focus first on styles of representation as explanatory factors for democratic expectations.

Styles of representation on the party level are captured as the main emphasis of each style within parties, here classified as partisans, trustees and delegates. The main difference between those three styles is the source used for decision making. The partisan follows the party policy as a source, the delegate (supposedly) follows the will of voters and the trustee uses his own judgement as a source for decision making. The partisan style is in line with the Responsible Party Model (RPM) which was classified in the 1950s as an ideal model for how representation should work (American Political Science Association 1950). In short, RPM assumes that parties, as the supply side, offer different policies to voters who are on the demand side. Voters choose the party that is closest to their own policy preferences and party representatives carry out the policy of the party. In RPM, political parties are the uniting link between the policy preferences of voters and parties. The requirements of RPM for a successful representation has both been criticised for being too simplistic and too strict (see for example Bengtsson and Wass 2011, Wessels and Giebler 2011, Valen and Narud 2007). The main criticism are that it does not give room for voters to choose parties based on other factors than their own or the parties policy preferences, nor a flexibility for individual MPs to deviate from their party's policy. While this criticism has some truth to it, parties do constrain politicians in their actions (Aldrich 1995) and it has been established that partisan representatives are closer to their own party on policy (Wessels and Giebler 2011) - lending at least a partial support for RPM as a model of representation. If RPM is a successful model for representation, voters' expectations about democracy should be better fulfilled when the

parties' representatives implement their party's policy or in other words, when representatives are partisans:

> H1: The higher the proportion of partisans within parties the better are party voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

The trustee style assumes that representatives use their own judgement when making decisions. Inherent in it is that trustees are competent enough to do so and they are trusted to make informed opinions. Obviously this goes against the RPM – which assumes that the party's policy should prevail. Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) argue that a decline in what they call partyness, and the increasing heterogeneity of constituents could promote the trustee role as a style of representation. Furthermore, modernisation and an increase in post-materialist values are more in line with the trustee style promoting the idea of sincerity, self-autonomy, individual fulfilment and genuine deliberation as opposed to following instructions of a collective such as a party or constituents. The increasing complexity of the issue space along with a growing number of independent as opposed to partisan voters has created what Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) label as the representational strain. Parties in modern democracies are to an increasing extent competing for and representing diverse voters. The representational strain is the dilemma about how to represent both the median independent voter and the partisan ideological voter. Under Strøm's (2012) rational approach the trustee style might be more fruitful to secure (re-)election the more heterogeneous constituents are as opposed to other styles. This line of argument assumes that trustee style is adopted because of increasing heterogeneity of voters and increasing complexity of the issue-space – that is promoting the trustee style is a reaction to changes in the composition of constituents. If the trustee style is promoted because of increasing heterogeneity among voters it can be assumed that their expectations about democracy are diverse as well. For that reason I hypothesise that the proportion of trustees within parties has no relation to how well their voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled, or:

> H2a: The proportion of trustees within parties does not explain how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled.

However, there is a competing line of argument that voters prefer their elected representatives to behave as trustees. If so, parties that emphasise that style should narrow the gap between

their voters' expectations and evaluation of democracy. This argument hinges on that voters prefer the trustee style as opposed to other representational styles (here partisan and delegate styles). Fox and Shotts (2009) argue that when voters prioritize competence over ideology they provide incentives for candidates to promote the trustee style. They also state that the trustee style is encouraged both when congruence between voters and representatives are high and low. Their argument is that when congruence is high, representatives are already close to their voters on policy, and for that reason they compete on skill instead of ideology. When congruence is low, there is no value add for representatives to compete on ideology and for that reason they have to compete on skill. If the trustee style is encouraged by voters, because voters prefer competence over ideology, their expectations about democracy should be better fulfilled when their party has a high proportion of trustees:

> H2b: The higher the proportion of trustee within parties the better are party voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

The delegate style assumes that voters' opinion should be followed regardless of representatives own opinion or the party's policy. The delegate style has been criticized for being over demanding assuming that voters have stable and exogenous policy preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005) and it is far from clear how those demands should be made known to representatives. A popular debate about how representation ought to work quite often revolves around that the delegate style is the ideal type for representation; that is the will of the voters should be decisive in policy making. Linked to that is the debate about "direct democracy", quite often using referendums as an example (e.g. Matsusaka 2005, Feld and Kirchgässner 2001) – and by "direct democracy" citizens get a more "direct" access to policy making. Underlying is the general idea that through the use of referendums the will of the voters can be accessed. However, greater access of the public via referendums and other means of more "direct democracy" do not necessarily result in more informed decisions as they often lack in time spent on deliberation. Fishkin's (2005) deliberative democracy has been promoted as a solution to this lack of deliberation. Its main idea is to involve citizens directly in decision making by randomly selecting participants to deliberate and take decisions about policy certain issues. While Fiskin's work is a novel attempt to empower citizens in the democratic process it lacks in many major aspects of democracy. One of the most prominent downside is the lack of accountability; it is not clear from whom participants in deliberative democracy get a mandate from or to whom they are accountable.

Based on the popularity of the delegate style in public discussion and the recent ideas that citizens should be more involved in policy decisions, the question here is whether those parties who promote the delegate style do in reality fulfil its voters expectations about democracy better compared to those who emphasise the partisan or trustee style. Given that the criticisms about the delegate style and the lack of accountability when using more "direct democracy" (such as referendums and deliberative democracy) are correct, I assume that party voters' expectations about democracy as <u>not</u> better fulfilled when their party has a high number of delegates. The lack of accountability when involving citizens directly in the decision making does not give reason to believe that voters' expectations about democracy are better met. The complexity of the issue space and how exactly voters signal their will to elected representatives does not give reason to believe that voters of delegate parties evaluate democracy more positively compared to partisan and trustee parties. On the contrary it can be assumed that voters' expectations about democracy are less fulfilled when a party has a high proportion of delegates. The reason for that is the uncertainty about how delegate representatives will make decisions as they do neither follow a known policy position of their party nor a known position of their own. Instead they claim to follow the will of the voters, a will that is both diverse and unknown. Thus I hypothesise:

> H3: The higher the proportion of delegates within parties the less are voters'
> expectations about democracy fulfilled.

Policy congruence as the outcome of representation is viewed as a link between the demand side (voters) and supply side (political elites) of democracy (Welzel and Klingeman 2011). It is commonly examined as how close parties and party voters are on the left-right scale (e.g. Ezrow 2010). The left-right dimension is generally regarded as a super-issue covering a broad range of diverse issues; many of them evolving around the role of the state in the economy (Hellwig 2008). With increasing de-alignment, depolarisation on the left-right, increasing complexity of the issue-space and post-industrialisation several studies have shown that the left-right ideology is now less salient than it used to be (e.g. Hellwig 2008, van der Eik et al. 2005). The number of independent voters, with no partisan attachment, seems to feed into an ideological strain between parties and party voters on left-right (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) show that partisan voters are closer to their parties on policy congruence compared to independent voters. However, they also show that that the proportion of partisan voters still make up off about half or more of voters

(from 45%) in the 20 European countries[1] included in their study. Based on that it can be assumed that in despite of decreasing salience of the left-right scale in modern democracies it is still meaningful as a common denominator between parties and their voters – and more so for partisan voters. Left-right congruence symbolically unites parties and voters (Belchior 2013), even if it predicts the vote to a lesser extent that before. Furthermore, van der Eijk and Schmitt (2010) find that voters' perceptions of parties placement on the left-right scale captures the policy content of party manifestos – quite often referring to the role of the government in the economy.

The question here is whether policy congruence explains how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Is it so that if there is a high congruence between party voters and parties on left right, that voters of those same parties are more positive in their evaluations about democracy? Thus I hypothesise:

> H4: The more policy congruence between parties and party voters the better are voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

Another reason for including policy congruence in this study is to control for a possible bias in its effect on styles for representation. Using an objective measure for policy congruence on the left-right scale[2] Önnudóttir (2013a) finds that the higher the proportion of trustees within parties along with a higher frequency of representation in government seems to increase congruence between parties and voters, while it decreases it for the proportion of partisans. For that reason it can be argued that policy congruence on left-right should be controlled for in an attempt to isolate the effect of the trustee and partisan styles on democratic expectations from policy congruence.

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[1] Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.

[2] Objective in the sense that she uses the absolute distance between party voters placement on the left-right scale and parties' placement on the same scale <u>as they are placed by their candidates</u>. Her measure of policy congruence is objective in the sense that she uses to independent sources for voters and parties' placements.

Research design

In this paper I make use of various data sources, with the main ones being the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS), European Social Survey (ESS) round six and the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES). Combined CCS, ESS and CSES cover in total 60 parties from nine countries: Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Germany 2009, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011. I pair parties and party voters into party dyads, linking the candidates' party from the CCS data to voters of the same party in the ESS. In three out of the nine countries, the question about vote-recall does not cover the same election as in the CCS data. Those three countries and elections are Belgium 2007, Ireland 2007 and the Netherlands 2006 and I include a dummy for them in my models to control for a possible bias due to the time lag between the CCS surveys and the voters' data (ESS and CSES).

Party voters' expectations about democracy
The ESS round six from 2012 offers a battery of 26 questions that do tap into both expectations about different aspects of democracy and evaluations of those same factors in each country included. The first half of the items ask about the importance of each factor for democracy on an 11 point scale (0=not important at all for democracy, 10=extremely important for democracy in general), capturing voters' expectations about democracy. The latter half asks about the status of the factors in respondents' respective country on an 11 point scale (0=does not apply at all, 10=applies completely), capturing voters' evaluations of democracy.

In this paper I use the distance between party voters' expectations about democracy and their evaluation of it in their country as a measure for how well or bad their expectations are met. Those holding high expectations about democracy naturally demand more of the political system compared to those with low expectations. Preferably the variance in how well their expectations are met should come from their evaluations of how it is carried out, not that they vary in their expectations. While further empirical analysis is needed to probe into whether voters' evaluations about democracy vary more compared to their expectations, a glance at the means and standard deviations for each pair of question gives a hint about the variance (table 1). In all items except two ('Voters discuss politics' and 'The media are free to criticise') is the variance higher for evaluations of democracy compared to expectations. That

Table 2. Expectations and evaluations of democracy, means and standard deviations.

	Expectations:		Evaluations:		Expectations subtracted from evaluations:	
	Means	Standard deviations	Means	Standard deviations	Means - difference	Standard deviations - difference
National elections are free and fair.	8.9	1.64	8.2	2.11	-0.8	0.47
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.	7.5	2.30	6.7	2.20	-0.8	-0.10
Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another.	7.7	2.06	5.9	2.32	-1.8	0.26
Opposition parties are free to criticise the government.	8.4	1.87	8.0	1.94	-0.4	0.06
The media are free to criticise the government.	8.2	2.07	8.0	2.05	-0.2	-0.02
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.	8.7	1.77	6.5	2.26	-2.2	0.49
The rights of minority groups are protected.	8.6	1.75	6.6	2.37	-2.0	0.61
Citizens have the final say on political issues by voting directly in referendums.	8.1	2.07	5.5	3.18	-2.6	1.12
The courts treat everyone the same.	9.2	1.49	6.2	2.94	-3.1	1.45
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.	8.3	1.99	6.4	2.71	-1.8	0.72
The government protects all citizens against poverty.	8.5	1.86	5.1	2.80	-3.4	0.94
The government explains its decisions to voters.	8.8	1.57	5.5	2.62	-3.4	1.06
The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels.	7.8	2.25	4.9	2.60	-2.9	0.35

indicates that it is voters' evaluations of democracy that influence how well their expectations are met – not the other way around.

An explorative factor analysis for voters' expectations about democracy shows that the thirteen items do tap into two dimensions, *democratic responsiveness* and *democratic governance* (table 2). [3] The items loading on democratic responsiveness are about

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[3] There is an additional pair of questions, asking about the importance that politicians take into account the views of other European government and to what extent that is done in respondents' country. Explorative factor

Table 2. Voters expectations about democracy – an explorative factor analysis.

	Democratic responsiveness	Democratic governance
Opposition parties are free to criticise the government	.88	
The media are free to criticise the government	.83	
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government	.79	
National elections are free and fair	.79	
The rights of minority groups are protected	.64	
The courts treat everyone the same	.54	
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote	.51	
Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another	.49	
The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels		.86
The government protects all citizens against poverty		.84
The government explains its decisions to voters	.32	.60
Citizens have the final say on political issues by voting directly in referendums		.51
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job		.42
% of variance	41.9	11.3

*Only those are included that have the right to vote in each of the nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland). Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Factors extracted if eigenvalue > 1. Factor loadings presented are from pattern matrix. Factor loadings under .30 are not shown. Data is weighted by design weight, correcting for slightly different probabilities of selection of respondents between countries. Program used: SPSS 20.

analysis shows that peoples expectations about this factor has a low correlation with the other items in this battery. Excluding the item results in that the remaining 13 items load on two factors. The first factor taps into expectations and evaluatinos about democracit governance and the second one is about democratic responsiveness within country. Given that the two items that are dropped are about expectations and evaluations about whether the national government takes into a account the views of other European government, it is of no surprise that they do not correlation with the two factors (democracit governance and democratic responsiveness).

effectiveness of opposition parties, the media, free and fair elections, equality (protection of minority groups and the courts treat everyone the same), deliberation (voters discuss politics) and clear political alternatives. Items loading on the governance factor are about the work of the government and voters' access to policy making (referendums). Each question about democratic expectations is paired with a question about the status of the same item in respondents' countries. The distance between the questions about expectations (the importance for democracy) and respondents' evaluation of the status in their countries tap into how well their expectations are fulfilled.

The focus of this paper is on how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled; that is the analysis is on the party level. For that purpose I calculate and test three scales for how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled; two for each of the factors resulting from the explorative factor analysis presented in table 1, *democratic responsiveness* (8 items) and *democratic governance* (5 items)*,* and one combining all thirteen items loading on both factors. I first subtract the respondent's evaluation of democracy from his/her expectations. In those cases when evaluation exceeds expectation (expectation over-fulfilled) I recode them to 0, indicating that expectations are met.[4] This results in an 11 point scale with 10 as the highest point (expectation not fulfilled at all – maximum distance between expectation and evaluation) and 0 the lowest (expectations fulfilled). In the next step I compute the mean distance of the items on each scale, only including those respondents who answer all the questions on the scale.[5] Third and final step is to compute the means on the three scales for each group of party voters. Instead of listing all the party voters' means for each of the three scales here, figure 1 shows the country means and figure 2 an example of the party means from Belgium. Both show a typical distribution of the means for every party included in the analysis. A table including all the means for how well democratic expectations are met for all 60 groups of party voters and the country means are in Appendix I.

Figures 1 and 2 both show that voters' expectations about democratic responsiveness are better met compared to expectations about democratic governance. The party and country voters' means using all thirteen items about democratic expectations is always lower than the means for democratic governance, indicating that expectations using all items are better met

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[4] Democratic evaluations exceed expectations in less the 12.2% cases for each item. The lowest range is 2.2% for „the courts treats everyone the same" and the widest range is 12.1% for „the media is free to criticise the government".

[5] 82.4% of the respondents reply to all 13 questions, 85.8% to the 8 questions loading on *democratic responsiveness* and 89.3% on the 5 questions loading on *democratic governance*.

Figure 1. Country voters' means for how well democratic expectations about democracy are fulfilled.

Figure 2. Belgian party voters' means for how well democratic expectations about democracy are fulfilled.

compared to limiting them to the five items used for democratic governance. On the contrary the means for democratic expectations using all thirteen items is always higher than the

means on democratic responsiveness which uses eight items. That indicates that voters' expectations are better met when limiting them to the eight items about responsiveness as compared to all thirteen items.

Both figures 1 and 2 show that the general trend of how well voters' expectations about democracy are met is the same for all three scales when comparing countries and parties. Using Portugal as an example, that ranks highest on all three scales for democratic expectations unfulfilled, the general trend of the order of each scale is the same as in other countries, with expectations about democratic responsiveness best fulfilled, expectations about democratic governance worst fulfilled and the scale with all items in between. Using the Belgian party Ecolo as an example the same trend is observed. It ranks highest on all three scales of democratic expectations unfulfilled, with democratic responsiveness best fulfilled, democratic governance worst fulfilled and the all thirteen items scale in between. These trends indicate that using the scale for democratic expectations including all thirteen items should show similar results as for each of the subscales; democratic responsiveness and democratic governance. For the purpose of this paper I use the scale with all thirteen items for how well party voters' expectations about democracy are met. However, I run two additional models using each subscale. The results of those are presented in Appendix II and they show that it does not make a difference which of the three scales is used for democratic expectations as it is modelled in this paper.

Figure 1 shows that there is a country variation in how well voters' expectations are met. Voters' expectations about democracy are least fulfilled in Iceland and Portugal, while voters' expectations in countries such as Sweden and Denmark are better fulfilled. For that reason I calculate for each group of party voters the absolute distance between their means on democratic expectations and the country mean on the same scale. I include this measure in my model in order to control for a possible bias due to a country variation in voters' evaluations of democracy.

Styles of representation

Three questions from the CCS data reflect representatives' styles of representation as partisans, trustees and delegates. Those are about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different opinions between:

1. The party position and his/her party voters' opinion.
2. Constituency voters' opinion and MP's opinion.

3. Party position and MP's opinion.

"Constituency voters" and "his/her party voters" are both referred to as voters in this paper.[6] For each of the three styles, partisans, trustees and delegates I use two out of the three questions. Those who name the party in items 1 and 3 are partisans, those say that the MP should vote according to his own opinion when contrasted with voters and party in items 2 and 3 are trustees, and those who say that the MP should follow the voters' view in items 1 and 2 are delegates. The representatives who cannot be categorized according to this rule are coded as "non-classifiable".

Table 3 shows the proportion of representatives classified as partisans, trustees and delegates for the 60 parties. In 53 out of the 60 parties, less than 15% of the candidates are non-classifiable and in 56 of them less than 20%. The low proportion of non-classifiable candidates shows that the there is a systematic component in their replies that can be used to categorize them as trustees, partisans or delegates. Party measures on styles of representation used in my analysis, are the proportions of representatives within parties who are either: 1) partisans, 2) trustees or 3) delegates. Representatives that are non-classifiable are included in the calculation for the proportion of each style within parties, but not analyzed any further. An example of party measures for the Socialist Party in Belgium is39.0 for the proportion of partisans, 34.2 for the proportion of trustees and 12.2 for the proportion of delegates.

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[6] The difference in terminology about voters between questions 1 and 2, the former asking about "his/her party voters" and the latter to "constituency voters", are both contrasted with either the party position or the MP's own opinion. It can be assumed that the responses reflect a difference between a bottom-up process as the role of delegate assumes, and a top-down process as the role of partisans and trustees reflect. For that reason it is meaningful to apply the delegate role to those who name voters in question 1 and 2 and contrast them with partisans and trustees.

Table 3. Styles of representation emphasised within parties.

	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	N
Belgium					
Socialist Party	39.0	34.2	12.2	14.6	41
Reformist Movement	28.3	32.6	13.0	26.1	46
Humanist Democratic Center	44.4	33.3	8.3	13.9	36
Ecolo	47.7	27.3	2.3	22.7	44
Christian Democratic and Flemish	41.7	31.3	16.7	10.4	48
New-Flemish Alliance	20.0	33.3	40.0	6.7	15
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A	57.1	28.6	14.3	0.0	35
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	32.0	30.0	28.0	10.0	50
Flemist Interest	38.2	29.4	23.5	8.8	34
Green!	32.1	48.2	12.5	7.2	56
Denmark					
Danish social democtrats	47.6	42.9	4.8	4.7	21
Danish Social-Liberal Party	26.1	65.2	8.7	0.0	23
Conservative Party	24.0	72.0	4.0	0.0	25
Socialist People's Party	35.7	64.3	0.0	0.0	28
Danish peoples party	56.3	40.6	0.0	3.1	32
Venstre	22.7	77.3	0.0	0.0	22
Liberal Alliance	18.5	66.7	7.4	7.4	27
Germany					
Social Democratic Party	19.9	56.3	9.3	14.6	151
Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union	9.3	75.5	8.4	6.8	163
Free Democratic Party	6.3	77.6	5.6	10.5	143
Alliance 90 / Greens	4.6	79.5	8.0	7.9	151
Left Party	13.1	51.8	23.4	11.7	137
Iceland					
Social Democratic Alliance	10.8	58.1	16.2	14.9	74
Progressive Party	16.9	61.5	7.7	13.9	65
Independence Party	8.9	73.2	7.1	10.7	56
Left Green Movement	13.2	52.9	17.7	16.2	68
Civic Movement	6.4	63.5	25.4	4.8	63
Ireland					
Fianna Fáil	57.1	14.3	7.1	21.4	42
Fine Gael	44.4	30.6	8.3	16.7	36
Labour Party	47.1	17.7	23.5	11.8	17
Green Party	53.6	28.6	14.3	3.6	28
Sinn Féin	66.7	0.0	16.7	16.7	12

Table 2 continued...

	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	N
Netherlands					
Christian Democratic Appeal	56.7	30.0	0.0	13.3	30
PvdA Labour Party	33.3	47.6	9.5	9.5	21
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	30.8	46.2	15.4	7.7	26
Green Left	27.3	72.7	0.0	0.0	11
Socialist Party	64.0	28.0	0.0	8.0	25
Democrats 66	22.2	72.2	0.0	5.6	18
Christian Union	55.6	33.3	0.0	11.1	9
SGP Political Reformed Party	63.6	27.3	9.1	0.0	11
Party for the animals	36.4	27.3	9.1	27.3	11
Portugal					
Left Bloc	12.2	39.0	39.0	9.8	41
Peoples Party	18.5	33.3	37.0	11.1	54
Democratic Unity Coalition	52.0	20.0	28.0	0.0	25
Social Democratic	26.5	42.9	22.5	8.2	49
Socialist	24.0	52.0	16.0	8.0	25
Sweden					
Center Party	38.8	37.8	16.3	7.1	196
Liberal Party	26.5	38.8	21.8	12.9	147
Christian Democrats	36.5	38.5	15.1	9.9	192
Green Party	21.8	42.1	27.4	8.6	197
Conservatives / Moderate party	46.9	24.6	17.6	10.9	256
Social Democrats	53.1	24.6	12.5	9.8	256
Sweden Democrats	60.0	24.0	12.0	4.0	25
Left Party	39.0	34.2	16.6	10.2	187
Switzerland					
Swiss People's Party	15.5	54.4	26.2	3.9	103
Social Democratic Party	15.0	67.1	9.6	8.3	167
FDP.The Liberals	12.1	62.9	21.8	3.2	124
Christian Democratic People's Party	9.2	55.0	31.3	4.5	131
Green Party	9.2	73.8	13.8	3.2	130
Green Liberal Party	4.2	70.8	20.8	4.2	72

Policy congruence

Policy congruence is calculated as the absolute distance between the mean of the party representatives' placement of their party on the left-right scale from the CCS data and the mean self-placement of party voters.[7] For five (Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal) out of nine countries I use the CSES data for party voters mean placement on

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[7] The formula for policy congruence using the means is: $LRDP_m = |V_m - P_m|$. $LRDP_m$ is the absolute left-right distance between the mean placement of party by its candidates and the mean self-placement of party voters, V_m is the mean-left-right placement of party voters and P_m is the mean left-right placement of the party as placed by its candidates. The scales for left-right are on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

the left-right scale covering the same election as in the CCS data. The same goes for the left-right placement of voters from Sweden and Switzerland, but instead of the CSES data I use the countries national election studies. The policy position of voters from Belgium is from the EES study that was carried out in 2009 and for Danish voters from the ESS 2012 study, both carried out two years after a general in each country.[8] Using two different data sources (one for voters and one for representatives) limits the danger of both assimilation and contrast effects as when using the same data-source, such as voters' self-placement and voters' placement of parties (perceived policy congruence). The bias for an assimilation effect is when respondents pull their preferred party closer towards them on the left-right spectrum, while the bias of a contrast effect is when they push non-preferred parties further away from their own position (Drummond 2010).

There are other options to calculate policy congruence between parties and party voters, such as using interpolated medians instead of means (van der Eijk's 2001) or the number of agreements on each side of the party dyad (Andeweg 2011, Golder and Stramski 2010). Those two measures take into account the possibility of different dispersions of the policy positions on each side of the dyad. I do intend to calculate those different ways to measure policy congruence and run the same models that are presented in my results. For the purposes of this paper, as it is now, the absolute difference between the means is used for congruence measures.

Control variables

According to Thomassen and Ham (2014) a political representation in a cleavage-based democracy is based on a descriptive representation and policy congruence is high on those issues that are part of a shared value system between the representatives and the represented.[9] This means that for social class parties, such as socialist/communist parties, congruence should be high on materialist left-right issues. It has also been found that traditional left-wing parties are more likely to emphasise the partisan style (see for example Gauja 2012, Wessels and Giebler 2011). For those reasons, (the link of social class parties to the partisan style and policy congruence on left-right) I include a dummy variable indicating whether the party is a social democratic party / communist party using the party codes from the Comparative Manifesto Data (CMP) (n.d.).

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[8] For Belgian voters I used the question about vote-recall and for Danish voters the question about vote-intention.
[9] Thomassen and Ham label this as a pure trustee model. However this they say based on strong linkages between political parties and civil society; which can also be understood as a pure partisan model.

Eulau et al's (1959) distinction between style and focus of representation, with the former about how to represent and the latter about whom, the trustee style is generally regarded as incorporating a nation-wide focus. Based on the assumption that the government has a nation-wide focus, Önnudóttir (2013b) finds that office-seeking parties (who are more often represented in government) seem to promote the trustee style. Apart from the link between trustee parties and policy congruence on left-right, it is possible that voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled the more often their party is represented in government. For those reasons I include a measure for parties' representation in government, using the proportion of days the parties have been represented in government in the four electoral terms preceding the election under study in each country.[10]

Wessels and Schmitt (2008) show that the wider and more numerous the policy options are that voters can choose from, along with a closer fit between the electorate and their voting options on left-right, the more meaningful their vote is. The question here is whether a variety in policy options, as captured by the number of effective parties, induces a closer fit between voters' expectations about democracy and their evaluation of it. For that reason I include a measure of the number of effective parties, using the relative seat share of parties in the parliament.[11]

Party characteristics and voters' expectations about democracy

To test my hypotheses about the effect of styles of representation and policy congruence on how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled, I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. Obviously the proportions for styles of representation within parties are not independent of each other, as a higher proportion in one group is followed by lower proportions in the other two groups. Because of that I run separate regressions for each style group; the proportions of partisans, trustees and delegates within parties. The regressions are done in six steps adding one party variable at the time and the two country variables together in the sixth step. In my discussion I focus on significant parameters. Because the parties included are not chosen randomly the significance levels are only meaningful as indicators

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[10] Information on the number of days parties have been represented in government is from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov).
[11] The number of effective parliamentary parties is calculated as such: parties=$1/\sum((\text{proportion of seats in the parliament})^2)$.

about the strength of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the response variable for those 60 parties that are part of my models.

My first hypothesis (H1), that the higher proportion of partisans within parties the better are party voters expectations about democracy met is supported (table 4). Explained variance (R^2) is only .06 when adding only the proportion of partisans to the model in the first step, but the effect is stable in all the remaining steps and is even a little bit stronger in the full model (step six). Out of the two competing hypotheses about the effect of the proportion of trustees on party voters' expectations about democracy, the one about its non-effect (H2a) is supported as opposed to the hypothesis that voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled when a party has a high proportion of trustees (H2b). The effect of the proportion of trustees on democratic expectations is very weak and negative in the first step of the model, with explained variance almost non-existent (R^2=.004). In the remaining steps the effect of the proportion of trustees on democratic expectations has a positive coefficient, but still weak and non-significant.

When parties have a high proportion of delegates, party voters' expectations about democracy are less fulfilled, lending support to my third hypothesis (H3). The effect is strongest in the first step of the model (Beta=.38) and explains 14% of the variance in democratic expectations. The effect of proportion of delegates drops a bit from the first to the sixth step, but still remains significant. The fourth and final hypothesis (H4), that greater policy congruence on left right goes together with that party voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled, is supported in all six steps of all three models. This indicates that the greater proximity on left-right between parties and party voters, the better are party voters expectations' about democracy fulfilled.

Table 4. Determinants of how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled.

	Standardized Betas						Standardized Betas						Standardized Betas					
Step:	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
% of party representatives who are:																		
Partisans	-.24+	-.32*	-.34**	-.37**	-.31**	-.34**												
Trustees							-.06	.08	.08	.11	.13	.09						
Delegates													.38**	.31*	.31**	.30*	.24*	.20+
Parties and party voters																		
Policy congruence		.42**	.38**	.33**	.31**	.27*		.38**	.34*	.31*	.30*	.31*		.29*	.24*	.21+	.21+	.24+
Party variables																		
Socialist/communist party			.31**	.33**	.28**	.26*			.28*	.30*	.25*	.22+			.28*	.30*	.25*	.22*
Representation in government				-.20+	-.14	-.12				-.16	-.11	-.07				-.12	-.08	-.05
Distance between party voters' mean on expectations about demcoracy and the country mean					.38***	.40***					.43***	.43***					.39**	.38**
Country variables																		
Number of effective parties						-.18						-.15						-.12
Dummy variable for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands						-.10						.06						.08
Intercept, p-value	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002
R^2:	.06	.22	.32	.35	.49	.51	.004	.13	.21	.23	.41	.44	.14	.22	.30	.31	.45	.48
Change in R2 significant, p value:	.072	.001	.009	.096	.000	.305	.638	.006	.023	.207	.000	.255	.003	.022	.016	.304	.001	.317

Note: Response variable is how well party voters expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Significance levels: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. N=60 parties.

In figures 3 and 4 the predicted values for democratic expectations for styles of representation and policy congruence are plotted, holding all other values at their means. The ranges of styles of representation are not the same between them all. They all have zero as the lowest point, but range is highest for the proportion of trustees (87.5%), thereafter is the proportion of delegates (73.6%) and it is the lowest for the proportion of partisans (66.7%). Therefore I plot the predicted values for democratic expectations using different high points on the range for styles of representation, rounding up to the next ten. The range of policy congruence is from .01 to 2.7 and for that reason I use zero as the lowest value for policy congruence and 3 as the highest for calculations for of the predicted values for democratic expectations.

Figure 3 shows that when the proportion of partisans is zero predicted values is 2.7 for how well democratic expectations are fulfilled. As the proportion of partisans increases the closer is the fit between party voters' expectations and evaluation of democracy, going down to as close as 1.6 when the proportion of partisans is 70%. Parties with the highest proportion of delegates (here 90%) are the worst when it comes to democratic expectations, with a predicted value as high as 3.3. While the proportion of trustees does not have a significant relation with democratic expectations it is of interest that the slope is positive, indicating that the higher the proportion of trustees the worse are democratic expectations fulfilled. Whether this relation becomes significant if more parties are added to the model is beyond the scope of this paper.

Figure 3. Democratic expectations predicted values for the proportion of partisans, trustees and delegates within parties.

Figure 3 shows that additional effects of policy congruence on democratic expectations are the same in all three models (partisans, trustees and delegates). It is noteworthy that in the trustee model the starting point for how well democratic expectations are met is higher (2.5) when policy congruence is high (0) compared to the trend in the partisan (2.0) and delegate model (1.8).

Figure 4. Democratic expectations predicted values for policy congruence.

Conclusion

In this paper I have established that both styles of representation emphasised within parties and policy congruence between parties and party voters, do explain how well party voters' expectations about democracy are met. When a party has a high proportion of partisans, expectations' about democracy are better met compared to those who have a low proportion of partisans. This lends a support to there being some truth to the Responsible Party Model (RPM), with parties as a uniting link between representatives and the represented.

The proportion of trustees within parties does not matter for how well their voters' expectations about democracy are met. It might be that increasing heterogeneity among voters and the increasing complexity of the issue space encourages representatives to adopt

the trustee style. Parties in modern democracies face the challenge of representing both independent voters and ideological partisan voters (Rohrschneider and 2012). This might produce incentives for representatives to adopt a trustee style, as they no longer face a constituency that has a shared value system uniting both the party voters among themselves and the party to its voters. Given that the incentive for the trustee styles is due to increasing heterogeneity of constituents it gives a reason to believe that voters of trustee parties are also diverse in their evaluations about democracy – and for that reason the proportion of trustees does not explain how well their democratic expectations are met.

Parties with a high proportion of delegates do worst when it comes to their voters' expectations about democracy. This goes against the popular debate that commonly refers to that the "will of the public" should be decisive in politicians' work and supports the idea that there is too much uncertainty involved regarding the delegate style. Voters do not know how delegate representatives will take decisions as they do not follow a known policy, neither from their party or their own. There is a possibility that voters of delegate parties, vote for them because they are already disappointed with democracy in their country. However, this point is beyond the empirical scope if the paper presented here, but is a clear avenue for future research to build upon.

Policy congruence as the link between parties and party voters, does explain a variance in party voters' expectations about democracy. The closer the fit between parties and party voters on left-left right (policy congruence) the better are their expectations about democracy met. Given that proximity between parties and party voters on the left-right scale does explain democratic expectations, it shows that in despite of de-alignment and decreasing saliency of the left-right dimension in modern democracies, it is still meaningful as a common denominator between parties and party voters.

The novelty of the approach taken in this paper is to examine how well democratic expectations about democracy are met on the party level, focusing here on styles of representation and policy congruence. Showing that party characteristics do explain democratic expectations gives reason to believe that focusing on the role of the parties in shaping the representational bond between the represented and representatives is a clear and broad avenue for future research on representation.

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Appendix I

Table 5. How well are party voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

	Means for how well party voters' expectations are fulfilled:		
	Democratic responsiveness (8 items)	Democratic governance (5 items)	All 13 items about democracy
Belgium			
Socialist Party	2.10	3.57	2.65
Reformist Movement	2.34	3.91	2.91
Humanist Democratic Center	1.99	3.53	2.55
Ecolo	2.37	3.94	2.97
Christian Democratic and Flemish	1.33	2.59	1.82
New-Flemish Alliance	1.60	3.01	2.13
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A	1.47	2.91	2.03
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	1.33	2.42	1.75
Flemist Interest	1.78	3.63	2.44
Green!	1.65	3.03	2.16
Total	1.78	3.18	2.30
Denmark			
Danish social democtrats	1.26	2.06	1.53
Danish Social-Liberal Party	1.39	1.66	1.48
Conservative Party	1.21	1.28	1.25
Socialist People's Party	1.48	2.64	1.93
Danish peoples party	1.49	2.61	1.93
Venstre	1.18	1.50	1.30
Liberal Alliance	1.16	1.49	1.29
Total	1.34	1.97	1.57
Germany			
Social Democratic Party	1.60	4.16	2.56
Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union	1.58	3.47	2.28
Free Democratic Party	1.56	3.60	2.34
Alliance 90 / Greens	1.89	4.30	2.80
Left Party	2.26	5.58	3.53
Total	1.73	4.09	2.60
Iceland			
Social Democratic Alliance	2.45	4.02	3.09
Progressive Party	2.18	3.49	2.66
Independence Party	2.09	3.60	2.66
Left Green Movement	2.37	3.86	2.90
Civic Movement	2.77	4.94	3.65
Total	2.27	3.75	2.82
Ireland			
Fianna Fáil	1.29	2.28	1.64
Fine Gael	1.44	2.39	1.78
Labour Party	1.70	2.67	2.06
Green Party	1.49	2.19	1.76
Sinn Féin	1.72	3.02	2.21
Total	1.57	2.58	1.94

Table 5 continued…

	Means for how well party voters' expectations are fulfilled:		
	Democratic responsiveness (8 items)	Democratic governance (5 items)	All 13 items about democracy
Netherlands			
Christian Democratic Appeal	1.14	1.96	1.44
PvdA Labour Party	1.26	2.48	1.70
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	1.15	1.68	1.35
Green Left	1.51	2.29	1.82
Socialist Party	1.49	3.07	2.06
Democrats 66	1.40	1.90	1.58
Christian Union	1.27	1.65	1.45
SGP Political Reformed Party	1.42	1.88	1.58
Party for the animals	1.99	2.79	2.34
Total	1.34	2.32	1.69
Portugal			
Left Bloc	3.70	6.62	4.85
Peoples Party	3.28	5.44	4.14
Democratic Unity Coalition	2.87	5.18	3.71
Social Democratic	2.47	4.25	3.10
Socialist	2.86	5.12	3.62
Total	2.81	5.00	3.58
Sweden			
Center Party	1.10	1.54	1.28
Liberal Party	1.22	1.75	1.39
Christian Democrats	1.30	1.61	1.45
Green Party	1.26	2.36	1.64
Conservatives / Moderate party	1.17	1.57	1.28
Social Democrats	1.03	2.16	1.43
Sweden Democrats	1.70	2.97	2.14
Left Party	1.95	3.31	2.48
Total	1.22	2.03	1.50
Switzerland			
Swiss People's Party	1.43	1.86	1.58
Social Democratic Party	1.97	2.79	2.28
FDP.The Liberals	1.29	1.42	1.34
Christian Democratic People's Party	1.07	1.45	1.21
Green Party	1.56	2.17	1.79
Green Liberal Party	1.34	1.44	1.37
Total	1.43	1.93	1.60

Appendix II

TO BE CONSTRUCTED

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