

The Consequences of Corruption on Electoral Behaviour. Leader vs. Party Effects. Do Voters Choose the Lesser Evil?

by

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This paper examines corruption's consequences on electoral behaviour: whether and how people adopt their vote decisions/strategies to an increased level of corruption. The focus is on four key factors people include in their vote decision: ideological positions, government performance, leader and party evaluations, and how political corruption affects their role in voting decision. I expect corruption to tack leaders' attraction on and strengthen the marginal effect of their evaluation on vote choice. An increased perceived level of corruption creates a good opportunity for popular leaders to attract more votes in contexts where future promises or past performances do not manifest themselves clearly enough to factor in vote decisions. In these conditions, leaders' evaluations shall outplay other voting behaviour determinants in environments with high indices of corruption. These contexts foster a sense of mistrust beneficial to popular leaders who engage in a trust-repair process and look competent and reliable. Voters choose those political actors who appear as the most credentialed and trustable among the corrupted ones when they face the "choosing the lesser of two evils" dilemma.

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Previous studies have focused on corruption's consequences on shaping political behaviour, regime survival, trust and democratic values (Seligson, 2002; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Canache and Allison, 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Shabad and Slomczynski, 2011; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2011). It has been showed that a high level of perceived corruption undermines democratic linkages and alerts citizens that electoral promises are unlikely to be honoured and, at the same time, incites to clientelistic behaviour (Choi&Woo 2011) and "personalistic" politics. This paper examines corruption's consequences on electoral behaviour: whether and how people adopt their vote decisions/strategies to an increased level of corruption. The focus is on four key factors people include in their vote decision: ideological positions, government performance, leader and party evaluations, and how political corruption affects their role in voting decision. Based on the previous literature one may foresee the changes in the level of ideological and economic vote as corruption increases, but it is less obvious how leader and party effects are adjusted to the new context, especially because scholars of voting behaviour still disagree about the roots and importance of leader effects on voting decision, relative (or in an absolute sense) to the party effects. Hence, after a general discussion about the aftereffects of corruption on electoral behaviour, an extensive part of the paper is on leader effects and their magnitude in high-corruption environment.

I analyse to these effects the extensive empirical evidence provided by the CSES Module 3 dataset and the World Bank and Transparency International macro indicators of perceived corruption. I use multilevel models to examine whether government performance, ideological position, party or leader evaluations effects are contingent upon level of corruption, and try to disentangle the effect of leader evaluations on the vote choice relative to party evaluations. Additionally, using indicators of corruption from two different sources offers a higher degree of validity to the final results, in the context of negative evaluations of World Bank governance indicators.

Political Corruption

The effects of corruption on individual behaviour are by no means a new research topic. Previous studies have showed that political corruption seen as "misuse of public office for private gain" (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000, 32) undermines democratic principles as accountability, equality and fairness, reduces citizens' support for political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), political trust (Chang and Chu, 2006; Morris and Klesner, 2010), regime legitimacy (Della Porta, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Scholars argue that corruption leads to a smaller vote turnout, alienating and disentangling citizens from electoral politics (Davis *et al.*, 2004; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2011). Previous studies focused especially on the incumbent support. Fackler and Lin(1995) finds a negative relationship between information about corruption and electoral support for the party in control of the presidency. The government is punished for an increase in perceived corruption, when economic matters do

not constitute a more important topic in the elections (Shabad and Slomczynski, 2011). Peters and Welch (1980) and Welch and Hibbing (1997) showed that incumbent candidates being charged with corruption suffer a loss of 6-11 percent depending on the type of corruption charge (see also Chang and Golden, 2004, for the Italian example). They also acknowledged that the incumbents have a high probability of being reelected despite the allegations of corruption and explained it with voters' closeness to the candidates or argued that candidates' abilities may weight more than the corruption charges in the vote decision. Manzetti and Wilson (2007) in contrast claim that corrupt government maintain public support by satisfying their clientelist networks.

Political corruption decreases the level of political trust, accountability and responsiveness and increases clientelistic behaviour. In voting behaviour this would lead to lower level of performance and policy-based vote – which translates in less party-related issues vote. In countries with a high level of political corruption, the incumbent may resist in power because of the access it has to economic resources that it redistributes to clientelist networks, but it also can be punished because of the allegations of corruption. Voters are more inclined to abstain from voting, but when they vote, do they adjust their voting strategies to the new context? I expect corruption to affect voting decision process in two interrelated ways: first, corruption decreases the level of accountability and responsiveness – thus people vote less based on performance and policy promises, and then trust-eroded effect of corruption gives advantages to trustworthy-looking politicians and party leaders who can improve the trust repair process and attract citizens to their side. The next section explores these processes in detail and presents the theoretical expectations.

Political Corruption – Trust – Electoral Behaviour

Political corruption erodes voters' trust in political system and institutions (Della Porta, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006; Seligson, 2002). Despite the recursive relationship between corruption and trust (Hetherington, 1998; Morris and Klesner, 2010; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999) there is no doubt that a high level of perceived corruption would lead to an environment dominated by institutional distrust, which could either alienate people from politics or make them vulnerable to political actors who can play the trustworthiness card.

There are tons of pages written on the distinction between interpersonal and institutional/political trust. Interpersonal trust, or trust in persons (horizontal trust) is built on a one-to-one interaction, while trust in institutions (vertical trust) is a one-to-many interaction, where citizens create a hypothetical relationship with every individual within the institution. Political trust thus is based on an “encapsulated interest”: A trusts B to do x (Hardin, 1998), that “depends on the perceived legitimacy, technical competence and ability to perform assigned duties efficiently” (Khodyakov, 2007, 127). This is the traditional instrumental model of the psychology of trustworthiness, where the level of trust is dictated by the degree to which individual interests are served by

the decisions of authorities (Tyler, 1998). In these circumstances, corruption erodes trust in institutions by diminishing people's expectations, confidence that these would fulfil their obligations. Perceived corrupted political actors do not keep their promises and citizens expect a high level of shirking or rent seeking. Duch (2001, 897) argued that voters with a low level of trust in political actors believe that a pure sanctioning strategy won't stop the rent seeking or shirking behaviour, consequentially economic voting is contingent upon level of trust. On the same argument people with less trust in political parties have less expectations that they will implement the policies they advocate for in electoral campaigns and not try to follow their own interests. Consequentially, a high level of corruption reduces the level of perceived accountability and responsiveness and undermines economic and policy-based vote.

Political trust may also be seen as a type of interpersonal trust, or as Harre (1999) defined it, a species of person-to-person relation" at least from the perspective of the one who trusts. "Our beliefs about, as well as our affective and social relations to, the personnel account for standing in a trust relation to the institution they staff"(idem, 260). This is especially possible in the new media era, where members of political parties and government seem to be known through the activity of the media, and citizens have the illusion of person-to-person relationship based on trust or distrust. Opposite to the instrumental model of trust, this is more a "relational psychological perspective on authority" based on the sense of identity people derive from their relationships with authorities (Hardin, 1998, 281). People trust others like themselves and corruption destroys this bond by making political actors look dishonest and not able to respect the ethical commitment with the voters. The generalised feeling of distrust associated with a high level of corruption makes people distant themselves from political individuals and increase the general apathy towards politics.

When trust is betrayed, the trustee tries to re-establish the relationship and build an image of reliability. In corrupted countries, with low level of trust, those who violated the relationship are not necessarily those who need to repair the damage. One way of building a good image about the trustee's integrity is by bolstering beliefs about the trustee's competence (Baumeister&Jones 1978). This is similar to the selection of "good" (or less bad) representative types (Fearon, 1999) model in voting behaviour literature: voters may opt for non-sanctioning strategies and focus on discerning between the corrupted politicians.

However, an environment dominated by corruption and low institutional trust blurs the image political parties because of the general belief that all politicians are corrupted, and it is more difficult for voters to find a party without any allegations of corruption. In this context, political actors who can offer better cues for selecting the "good" choice benefit from trust repair. The social trust psychological approach suggests that individual political actors, compared to institutional ones (as parties), have a better chance, since people build indirect personal trust with politicians as seen on TV screen and form a positive opinion about the competence of a person faster than for an organisation with multiple actors. In these contexts, party leaders seem to have better chances to attract votes than the party. However, before concluding on the effect of leader

evaluations on vote choice compared to party evaluations impact, a review of the literature on leader effects could offer more insights.

Leader effects in the literature

Topics understated in the past – e.g. individual issues or personalisation of politics – have become more attractive for research. Economic and social changes, in conjunction to media and technological development made politicians, especially party leaders, more appealing to public and mass media, and for parties an important resource in the electoral campaigns. This led to the personalisation or presidentialisation of politics hypothesis, based on the idea that collective actors' position in politics (parties, social groups) is partially taken by individual politicians. Thus, either chief executives or party leaders become more important in attracting votes for their party (see Karvonen, 2010, and; McAllister, 2007, for a review; and Rahat and Sheafer, 2007, for an overview of the distinction between institutional, media and behavioural personalization). Governmental cabinets are named after their leader; campaigns are centred on party leader's tv appearances; and their personalities are put in balance with party attributes. The empirical findings regarding the electoral influence of party leaders are however ambiguous. Some scholars argue that leader effects have a significant contribution in the party vote share (Mughan, 1993; McAllister, 2007; McAllister, 2011) and have become stronger over time (Wattenberg, 1991, 1998; Clarke, 2004; Mughan, 2000). Others found no direct effect and with no increasing trend over time when other factors are considered (Crewe and King, 1994; Curtice and Holmberg, 2005; several studies included in the edited book: King, 2002; Miller *et al.*, 1990).

Party leaders' power within politics is irrefutable: "journalists believe it, politicians believe it, [E]ven voters themselves believe it" (Bartle and Crewe, 2002, 92). What political scientists disagree about is their direct effect on voting behaviour and their net effect in elections compared to other well-accepted predictors of vote decision as partisanship or party evaluations. Leadership affects the defection and conversion between parties, but has a small net effect on the electoral outcomes (Graetz and McAllister, 1987). Leaders however can be vote-magnets and offer important cues to the voters, especially during the campaigns. Campbell and his colleagues (Campbell *et al.*, 1960) emphasised the overlaying of Eisenhower's personal popularity upon long-term influences like partisan loyalties. Additionally, Jenssen and Allberg (2006) showed that in a four-year perspective, party popularity has a stronger impact on vote decision, but during the elections leader charisma seems to matter more.

It is difficult to disentangle the contribution of the leader and party evaluations to vote share, especially because they are to a certain extent interdependent, "they are bound to affect one another and the leaders' so-called direct effects on voters are largely mediated in practice by television and the press" (Crewe and King, 1994), and "it is the reinforcement of parties and their personnel [leaders], which matters most for vote choice" (Wagner and Weßels, 2011, 10).

Studies have showed that leader electoral contribution are magnified or reduced by contextual effects. Presidential and majoritarian electoral systems have been seen to enhance leader effects (Mughan, 2000) because of the power party leaders have in presidential vs. parliamentary systems, and majoritarian vs. PR electoral contexts. Presidents have individual responsibility to the voters and the party discipline is weaker than in parliamentary systems. Furthermore, they have more flexibility in formulating and implementing policies, which together with presidential campaigns run by candidates themselves leads to candidate-centered politics (Wattenberg, 1998, 2011)¹. Regarding the electoral system, the contrast is not that obvious; on the one hand majoritarian electoral systems centers on individual candidates, among which the party leader is the most salient figure (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2011), but on the other hand, in PR systems, leaders occupy the first positions on the list, being the locomotive of the party which makes them the face representing the party. From a theoretical perspective, when contexts (here institutional framework) diminish the importance of party-related factors, party leader effects arise. In countries where parties differ little (low ideological polarization), for example, leaders matter more (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2011).

Electronic media have a similar effect by increasing the exposure of leaders personality and performance relative to the presence of party as an entity in the media coverage. This is explained by the fact that it is easier to communicate and also understand political information through familiar personalities than through abstract documents or institutions (McAllister, 2007, citing Glaser and Salmon(1991) and Ranney(1983)). Television appearance changes the way people evaluate politics, priming them to rely more on personality perceptions (Druckman, 2003). Overall “media exposure is a necessary condition to ensure a leader’s electoral competitiveness, but [it is] not a sufficient condition for his or her electoral success” (McAllister, 2007, 9).

On the idea that leader effects rise when parties matter less (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2011) and that new media development increased the role of party leaders in the electoral competition, we continue the rationale from the previous section. In countries with high level of corruption, leaders have the chance to attract more votes and compensate for a smaller economic and policy-based vote. However, leader’s influence may, once again, not manifest itself in the vote choice, but be incorporated in the general party effects. Moreover, leader effects may have a significant contribution on the vote choice only if it is strong enough to cancel out the general apathy people have for the entire system.

To sum up, an increased level of corruption may send the rascals out of office, but at the same time, the incumbent has the advantage of using its power to keep the support of its clientelistic network. These scenarios depend on the campaign topics and whether the government uses indeed the country resources to stay in power. Studies indicated also that corruption matters in elections only when the economy is not the main topic in the campaign. The lack of trust generated by political corruption decreases the magnitude of economic and ideological vote,

¹ There is however evidence of presidentialisation of especially Westminster systems, with prime-ministers having a similar role as presidents (McAllister, 2011)

and instead party leaders can raise the vote share of the party if their evaluations are better than the ones of the party. Duch(2001) showed that a low level of trust will make people less willing to apply a pure sanctioning strategy and punish the government. In this sense economic voting is expected to be weaker in corrupted countries characterised by a high level of distrust than in less corrupted contexts. Ideological vote is also smaller in corrupted countries since people would not believe in the electoral promises politicians make and their ideological orientations would not be relevant in unpredictable futures, characterised by self-interested political behaviour. In these conditions, voters use other cues to choose their representatives, if they do not decide to abstain to vote. Voters face a "choosing the lesser of two evils" dilemma, or what Fearon(1999) described as the selection of "good"(or less bad) representative types. I argue that feelings towards party leaders have a strong influence in this vote strategy, because a person-to-person trust relationship is easier to be rebuilt than one with an abstract identity as a party organisation. The devil one knows from her public appearances on TV is better than the devil behind the political science, in the party organisation one does not get to know.

Research design and Analysis

In terms of research design, looking at the party choice and the probability of voting a party would be the ideal approach in understanding how much influence leaders gain in corrupted contexts. The problem is that the parties and even their number vary by country, which makes the comparison complicated. A better way of comparing the results across countries is to use the same dependent variable in all countries in a multilevel model. Thus, the outcome to be explained in this analysis is the vote for Prime Minister (PM) party. The advantage of using this variable is that Prime Ministers are most of the time the party leaders and a well-known figures, thus the probability that people hold/form opinions/evaluations/feelings towards them is higher than for other parties. Hence, this section tests whether evaluations of the PM party leader have a stronger impact in corrupted countries, while economic evaluations and ideological distance from the PM party influence less the vote decision in these contexts compared to in less corrupted countries. Since past research claimed that party effects are endogenous to the leader effects on vote choice, the analysis includes not only evaluations of the party leader, but also of the party.

To measure and compare the strength of leader effects across different levels of corruption is difficult because the quantity of interest is a causal effect of feelings towards party leader on party choice, which cannot be observed directly (more on that in Duch and Stevenson(2006))². Using multilevel modelling, we can observe the variation of these effects by including random slopes for the variables of interest (political party and party leader evaluations, government performance evaluations or ideological distance). After testing if the variation of random effects is significantly different from 0, we can examine whether the level of corruption in the country influences it.

The first step in testing the hypothetical relationship discussed in the previous sections is to examine the economic, ideological, and leader and party effects vote in a multilevel analysis. Data used in this part come from the first released CSES Module 3 dataset. Future analysis will use the extensive data when it is available. However, the 23 countries in the model offer a good initial view on whether the relations are in the expected direction³. A replication of the model with the full CSES data will offer also a sense of how robust the results are in a multilevel model where the level two elements are not randomly selected. Because of contradictory opinions regarding the accuracy and efficiency of quality of governance indicators developed by the World Bank(Devarajan and Johnson, 2008), the analysis includes additionally to this indicator of control of corruption, the Transparency International perceived corruption indicator. The analysis includes all the main predictors of vote choice (economic evaluations, ideological distance from PM party, feelings towards party and party leader) and

² (the same applies to the causal effects of evaluations of economy and ideological distance on vote choice for economic and ideological vote accordingly)

³ The countries in this model are: "AUS_2007" "BRA_2006" "HRV_2007" "CZE_2006" "FIN_2007" "FRA_2007" "DEU_2005" "DEU_2009" "ISL_2007" "ISL_2009" "IRL_2007" "ISR_2006" "JPN_2007" "MEX_2006" "MEX_2009" "NLD_2006" "NZL_2008" "NOR_2005" "POL_2005" "POL_2007" "PRT_2009" "SWE_2006" "THA_2007"

control variables (age, education, gender, urban status, income [maybe social class after]) at the individual level. At the macro level the variables considered are the key macro indicators (perceived corruption index and control of corruption indicator with a 0.99 correlation between them) and country characteristics (government, voting and electoral system, and democratic experience) (check Appendix 1 for the description of the variables included). All the individual variables are centered at the group mean, while the macro level predictors at the grand mean (Enders and Tofighi, 2007).

First we look at the between-country variation of the outcome in the baseline model (model including only a random intercept). If it is different from the chance level, a multilevel approach is appropriate. One of the methods used to see whether the variation is significantly different than 0 is a chi-squared test of the likelihood difference between the multilevel baseline model and a model without multilevel model. Because I am using the `lm4` package in R to run the models, the multilevel (`glmer`) models cannot be compared with the corresponding cross-sectional pooled model (`glm`) fits (the log-likelihoods are not commensurate (i.e., they include different additive terms)). In this case, I apply a Bayesian multilevel approach (MCMC) to estimate the credible intervals and see whether it includes 0. It results that vote for the incumbent (PM party) varies across countries. In some countries, the incumbent has more chances to be reelected than in others.

Next, including the individual level variables (main predictors and control variables) leads to a significant improvement of the model; the main vote choice predictors, especially, add extra power to the model (Table 1). Additionally including the macro variables (Model 1 – Table 2) also increases the goodness of fit. The final model contains also the random effects (slopes) of the key predictors and their interaction with level of corruption (Model 2 – Table 2). We can then move one step further and examine the across country variation of the effects of each main individual level predictor on vote choice. In order to see whether the random effects of the four predictors of interest are statistically significant, I remove the random effects of each predictor individually from the model we are interested in (Model 2 in Table 2), and run likelihood ratio chi-square tests of the expected effect of the random part of each predictor on vote choice.

[Table 1 – about here]

The random effects on vote choice of government performance evaluations, ideological distance, and party and leader evaluations are statistically significant (Table 1 – last column). These results echo findings from previous studies that strength of individual predictors' contribution on vote decision varies across countries. The question now is whether corruption explains this variation of the individual level predictors. Plotting the random effects of each of these predictors (from Model2 but without cross-level interaction effects) against the level of corruption (Figure 1), one can see that ideological vote and party effects decrease as corruption increases, while leader effects are raised by it. Economic vote is however not conditioned on the level of corruption.

[Figure 1 – about here]

Personal evaluations of government performance have the same weight in the vote decision no matter how corrupted or correct politicians are (Panel 1A). Promises and electoral programs however seem not to have the same role when corruption increases (Panel 1B). Considering party future program or simply liking a party is conditioned by corruption in the vote choice function (Panel 1C). Compared to the relationship between corruption and ideological vote, however, the one for party effects seems steeper. At this point in the analysis, the strongest eroding consequences of a high level of corruption are on party effects (at least graphically). And as expected, leaders gain more support when ideological and party evaluation-based vote declines (Panel 1D). However, we cannot consider Figure 1 as representing the statistically significant relationship between corruption and the four key vote predictors. In order to assign a level of confidence to these findings, we include in the model, the cross-level interactions between corruption and each predictor (Model 2 in Table 2).

[Table 2 – about here]

Individual and macro level control variables were not presented in the table because of matter of space (but can be offered under request), however the results for these variables follow the previous voting behaviour theories. Looking at the fixed effects of the four predictors of interest, they support the previous findings. As government evaluations become more favourable, the probability of voting for the government increases, the closer the government is to the voter on the left-right scale, the higher the chances of voting for the PM party. Positive evaluations of party or party leader have also an increasing effect on the probability of voting for the party.

Before discussing the cross-level interaction effects, a noticeable aspect in Models 1 and 2 is the coefficient of level of corruption (as measured by the World Bank). In Model 1, the probability of the incumbent to remain in power is not conditioned on the level of corruption. The incumbent can be replaced if accused of being corrupted, but at the same time, can stay in power by using the national resources to win support from clientelistic networks. These two scenarios may cancel each other out; hence the not significant effect of level of corruption on voting for the PM party. However, when the interaction effects of corruption with all four predictors are included, the level of corruption turns statistically significant and strengthens the chances of the PM party to remain in power (Model2). One of the explanations would be that, after controlling for indirect effect of corruption on voting for the incumbent through the role it plays in reducing the positive effect of ideological distance and party evaluations, an increased level of corruption favours the incumbent. Despite that, in Model 3, after excluding party effects from the model, corruption returns to be insignificant. Considering the strong impact party evaluation has on vote choice (some would say that it is tautological to use party evaluations and vote choice in the same sentence), the significant coefficient of corruption in Model 2 is a spurious effect, given the interaction with a variable strongly correlated with the dependent variable in the right-hand side of the equation.

Cross-level interactions: Corruption – predictor of predictors’ random effects

The most relevant aspects in Model2 are the cross-level interaction effects of corruption with the key predictors. Looking at the numbers in Table 2 under the Cross-level Interactions row, a first conclusion would be that, as reflected in Figure 1, a high level of corruption reduces the level of ideological vote and party effects⁴; but there is no significant relationship between the random effects of government performance and leader evaluations. As expected, people in corrupted countries trust less that politicians will follow ideological principles, but their self-interest. Evaluations of government performance have the same weight in corrupted or less corrupted countries. This contradicts the theoretical expectations that people would not punish the government for its bad performance since its change would not guarantee a better future with other corrupt, not trustable politicians⁵. Party evaluations are less important in vote choice function in corrupted countries; a distrusting environment makes people vote less the party they like, and look for other criteria to choose their representatives. A high level of corruption creates a high rejection of politics, many people abstain from voting, but those who do vote consider less the party characteristics – whether they like it or not, or their ideological promises.

Leader evaluations and corruption cross-level interaction is in the expected direction, as corruption increases, the leader effects become stronger predictors for vote choice. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. We can hope that the expectations will be validated within a larger sample, when the full CSES will be released, with more than 23 countries included. Looking at Model 3 instead, when party effects are not included in the model, the leader evaluation’s coefficient becomes significant, but in the opposite direction. This means that when we do not take into account the effects corruption has on party effects and that party effects vary across countries, the leader effects become smaller as level of perceived corruption increases. There are several reasons to believe that this relationship is spurious, and in fact the negative effects corruption has on leader effects mediate the effects of corruption on party effects in Model3. The correlation between feelings towards party and leader is 0.80 at the individual level, while their random effects have a correlation of -.665. The individual level relationship can be seen as positive feelings towards one of the them is followed by positive feelings towards the other (no causal direction implied), while the negative correlation at the country level could mean that as the effect of one of them increases, the effect of the other one decreases. It is however difficult to conclude that leader effects are negatively conditioned on corruption, since party effects are endogenous to the leader effects on vote choice. Model 4 (Table 2) tries to disentangle the effects of party and leader evaluations, but it will be discussed later.

⁴ The ideological distance*corruption is significant at 90% level of confidence

⁵ Because of the increased variation of the random effects of government performance evaluations, it is clear that there are other elements that make economic vote more relevant in some countries than the others, but corruption is not one of them. The corruption-economic vote cross-level interaction remains insignificant despite the changes made in the model – including or excluding random effects of the other three key predictors

Cross-level Interaction: Coefficients vs. Plotted Effects?

The multilevel model:

$$Vote_Choice = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i}*Party_Ev + \beta_{2i}*Leader_Ev + \beta_{3i}*Ideol_Dis + \beta_{4i}*Ideol_Dis + \beta_j*Indiv_Control_Var_j + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Where: $\beta_{0i} = \beta_0 + \gamma_1*Corruption + \gamma_k*Macro_Control_Var_k$

$$\beta_{1i} = \beta_1 + \theta_1*Corruption + \zeta_1 \text{ (Party Evaluation coefficient)}$$

$$\beta_{2i} = \beta_2 + \theta_2*Corruption + \zeta_2 \text{ (Leader Evaluation coefficient)} \quad (2)$$

$$\beta_{3i} = \beta_3 + \theta_3*Corruption + \zeta_3 \text{ (Government Performance coefficient)}$$

$$\beta_{4i} = \beta_4 + \theta_4*Corruption + \zeta_4 \text{ (Ideological Distance coefficient)}$$

Thus, the combined multilevel model is:

$$Vote_Choice = \beta_0 + \gamma_1*Corruption + \gamma_k*Macro_Control_Var_k + (\beta_1 + \theta_1*Corruption + \zeta_1)*Party_Ev + (\beta_2 + \theta_2*Corruption + \zeta_2)*Leader_Ev + (\beta_3 + \theta_3*Corruption + \zeta_3)*Ideol_Dis + (\beta_4 + \theta_4*Corruption + \zeta_4)*Ideol_Dis + \beta_j*Indiv_Control_Var_j + \varepsilon \quad (3)$$

Let's consider the numbers in Table 2 and look at equations of the multilevel (3). The fixed effects section of the table indicates β_0 for the intercept, β_1 , β_2 , β_3 and β_4 for the key predictors, and γ_1 for corruption. We are interested in the Cross-level interactions section in Model 2, which is representing θ_1 for the interaction between corruption and party evaluations, and accordingly θ_2 , θ_3 , and θ_4 for the other predictors. As can be seen in Equations (2), if θ_1 , θ_2 , θ_3 , θ_4 are significant in Table 2, this means that corruption explains part of the across-country variation of the coefficients β_{1i} , β_{2i} , β_{3i} , β_{4i} in the multilevel model (1). Thus, the fixed effects coefficient of corruption represent its direct impact on the probability of voting for the incumbent, while the Cross-level Interaction coefficients are the indirect effect of corruption. In Model 2, as already discussed, the direct effect of corruption is positive and significant at 95% confidence level, while the indirect effect is statistically significant at 90% confidence level, only for party effects and ideological vote. Corruption is a predictor of the random effects of party evaluations and ideological distance between the voter and PM party.

Looking at the cross-level interaction effects' coefficients is just part of the story of how individual predictors' effects on vote choice are conditioned on the level of corruption. The next step is to analyse graphically the marginal effect of the predictors by level of corruption and the predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent at different levels of corruption and for different values of the individual level predictors.

[Figure 2 – about here]

Figure 2 shows how a one unit increase in ideological distance, party, leader or government performance evaluations (from their country mean) affects the probability of voting for the incumbent across the observed range of corruption

(holding all the other variables in the model at their country mean (individual level variables) or the grand mean (macro level variables)). We can see that all the predictors increase the probability of the incumbent to remain in power no matter what the level of corruption is in the country (the plotting line and its 95% confidence intervals do not cross 0).⁶ In Panels 1A, 1C and 1D it seems that the magnitude of the ideological or economic vote and party effects increases as the level of corruption grows and approaches the sample grand mean. After that level the impact of these three predictors does not vary across country. However, the 95% confidence intervals in all three panels overlap across the observed range of corruption, thus there is no statistically significant difference between the marginal impact of ideological distance, party or government performance evaluations for different level of corruption (when one considers a one unit increase from their country mean). Leader effects, on contrary, get significantly larger for level of corruption higher than its grand mean.

[Figure 3 & Figure 4 – about here]

Figure 2 illustrated the marginal effect of the key predictors around their country mean. Using a logit model implies that the magnitude of the independent variables differs across the range of that predictor. In addition, there are reasons to believe that corruption may play a more significant role in shaping the impact of ideological distance, party, leader or government evaluations at their extreme values. Thus, Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows how a unit increase in ideological distance, party, leader or government performance evaluations, from the minimum (min), and to the maximum (max) accordingly, affects the probability of voting for the incumbent across the observed range of corruption (holding all the other variables in the model at their country mean (individual level variables) or the grand mean (macro level variables)). In few words, when voters move one unit from completely disliking a party or leader, or the party is one unit closer to them from the extreme of the ideological scale, the probability of voting for the party raises significantly only in countries with a high level of corruption (the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap when the level of corruption is higher than the grand mean). On the other side of the scale, when people have already high evaluations of the party or leader, and the party holds the same ideological position, the raise in the probability of voting for the incumbent of one unit increase in the predictor does not vary across the observed range of corruption (the confidence intervals overlap for all four predictors), even if it seems that, contrary to the findings in Figure 3, the magnitude of ideological vote and party effects seems to decrease as corruption increases.

A similar graphical analysis of the results in Model 3, without party effects included, shows that ideological distance, government performance and leader evaluations increase the probability of the incumbent to remain in power no matter what the level of corruption is in the country (the plotting line and its

⁶ The effect is calculated as the difference between the predicted values of each key variable at one standard deviation upon and below the country mean using the fixed effects in the model (the marginal effect and its 95% confidence intervals calculated based on the indications from (Brambor *et al.*, 2006)

95% confidence intervals do not cross 0), but the magnitude of change is not significantly different across level of corruption (the confidence intervals overlap for all predictors – except ideological distance changing one unit from its minimum, when the graph looks identical to Panel 3C)⁷.

[Figure 5 and 6 – about here]

Plotting the predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent in two different corruption environments on the key individual level predictors (ideological distance, government performance, party and leader evaluations), confirms the findings from the previous plots.⁸ Figure 5 shows how ideological distance influences the predicted probabilities in countries with a high level of corruption (the sample 75% quintile) compared to countries with a low level of corruption (the sample 25% quintile). Contrary to the findings in Table 2, the impact of ideological distance is higher in countries with a high level of corruption. This does not apply when the distance between the voter and the party on the ideological scale gets really small (the 95% confidence intervals overlap).

Before concluding that corruption increases the magnitude of ideological vote, it is important to notice that the predicted probabilities include not only the impact of ideological distance and its interaction with corruption, but also the main effect of corruption. In Model 2, because of the inclusion of party evaluation random effects, the main effect of corruption is positive and statistically significant. Measured on a scale from 0 to 10 as ideological distance, and also party and leader effects, we can compare the magnitude of their coefficients in Model 2 and say that the negative coefficient of the cross-level interaction between corruption and ideological distance (-0.019) does not cancel out the strong positive main effect of corruption (0.291) or ideological distance (0.260), hence the advantage of high level corruption in Figure 5. In Model 3 however, since the main effect of corruption is smaller and not significant after removing the party effects from the model, the 95% confidence intervals of the predicted probabilities of ideological distance overlap, and there is no significant difference between the predicted probabilities of ideological distance in countries with low or high level of corruption⁹.

The relationship between corruption, government performance evaluations and predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent seem even more surprisingly different in Figure 6 than the results in Table 2. The cross-level interaction effects were not statistically significant, but positive which increases the positive main effect of corruption, hence the significant difference between the predicted probabilities in countries with high vs. low level of corruptions in Figure 6. However, when the main effect of corruption becomes insignificant in Model 3, the graphically displayed 95% confidence intervals overlap and there is no difference between the predicted probabilities of government evaluations in the two contexts.

⁷ All the graphs mentioned are available under request.

⁸ The predicted probabilities and their 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the fixed effects coefficient in Model 2 and their variance-covariance matrix.

⁹ The graphs for Model 3 can be provided under request.

[Figure 7 and 8 – about here]

Figure 7 shows the predicted probabilities of party effects and the same rationale as for Figure 5 applies here. The cross-level interaction of party effects with corruption was negative in Table 2, but the main effect of corruption is stronger and positive, thus the difference in Figure 7. What is noticeable in this graph is that, party effects, when it approaches its maximum value, predicts almost 90% of the probability of voting for that party. It is like explaining the variation of dependent variable through itself. This raises questions about the validity of the results in Model 2, but Model 3 illustrates that the results do not change much except leader effects and the main effect of corruption when party effects are removed.

Leader effects seem to be significantly higher in high-corrupted contexts than in countries with less corruption, if we look at Figure 8. However, the cross-level interaction effects in Model 2 were not statistically significant, and this could be only the spurious effect of a strong, positive and statistically significant main effect of corruption and leader evaluations. When party effects are removed in Model 3, the 95% confidence intervals of predicted probabilities of leader evaluations in the two types of contexts overlap. Because of the endogeneity of party effects to the impact of leader evaluations on vote choice, it is still not clear how leader effects vary across countries.

The difference in evaluations of leader vs. party

In the previous section, we saw that party effects are slightly reduced by an increased level of corruption, while leader evaluations are first amplified by corruption when party effects are controlled for (even though the cross-level interaction is not statistically significant) and then reduced when party evaluations random effects are removed. The only clear conclusion is that corruption decreases the impact of party evaluations, but there is no straightforward results concerning the relationship between corruption and leader effects, especially because of the endogeneity of party evaluations to leader effects on vote choice. In this context, we can replace party and leader evaluations variables in Model 2 and 3 with the difference in the evaluations of these two. The argument is that, if leaders become a more important asset for party when level of political corruption increases and party effects declines, the advantage that leader may have to a party in people's mind weights more. Moreover, taking the difference in evaluations between party and leader indicates whether party effects are conditioned on the evaluations of the party leader. The expectations are that the probability of voting for the incumbent is smaller when there are differences between party and leader, despite the evaluations of the two, but in contexts with high corruption the negative effect of the difference is reduced as leader evaluations get higher compared to party evaluations. In a context where all the parties and politicians are seen as corrupt, better evaluations of one of them, mainly for leaders, increase the chances of success in elections. Model 4 (Table 2) includes the difference in evaluations of leader and party, a higher value indicates that the leader has a better image

than the party. In order to test whether the probability of voting for the incumbent decreases as the difference between leader and party increase we include a squared term of difference variable. The cross-level interaction between corruption and the difference was expected to be positive.

The effect of difference is indeed in an inverse-U shaped relationship with the probability of voting for the incumbent. For small values of difference (which means higher evaluations of the party than the leader) the probability of casting a vote for the party is small, but increases as the difference becomes smaller, while after the point where both party and leader are equally evaluated, the probability of voting the party decreases again as leader gets more positive evaluations compared to the party (the coefficient of the squared term is negative). The cross-level interaction is also positive, which means that a higher level of corruption will reduce the decreasing effect of a higher difference between leader and the party. Figure 9 shows the change in predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent for one unit increase in the difference in evaluations of leader vs. party across a range of observed level of corruption (holding all the other variables in the model at their country mean (individual level variables) or the grand mean (macro level variables)). Panel 9A illustrates the difference in predicted probabilities of one unit decrease as party evaluations get at their maximum (party evaluation = 10) and leader evaluations at their minimum. As party gets more appreciated than its leader, the probability of voting for that party declines, no matter where the voters live. However, if they are in a country with high-perceived corruption, the decline ranges from 2.5% to almost 15% compared to 0-2.2% in not-corrupted countries. At the other side of the difference scale, as leader evaluation approaches its maximum and party evaluation its minimum, the decline in the probability of supporting the party in the elections is significant across all levels of corruption, with a variation from 0 to 4% in less corrupted countries and between 4% and 9,5% in contexts with a high level of corruption.

If we look at the predicted probabilities of the difference in evaluation of the leader and party in Figure 10(holding all the other variables in the model at their country mean (individual level variables) or the grand mean (macro level variables)), it seems that as the evaluations get more pro leader, the probability increases in countries with high level of corruption. However, this relationship is not statistically significant (the 95% confidence intervals overlap) and part of the difference between countries is due to the high positive (and statistically significant) level of corruption's main effect.

Corruption(WB) vs. Corruption(TI)

One last element of the analysis is how different the corruption indicators are when they come from two different sources: World Bank (index used in the analysis in the previous pages) and Transparency International. In order to compare them, they were rescaled to 0 to 10 scale, and their grand means (before centering) was not statistically different. Table 3 includes Model 1 and 2 from our previous analysis, run using both indicators. Transparency

International index gives smaller coefficients and larger cross-level interaction effects, but the level of statistical significance or the direction of the effects are not changed. Conducting a t-test of the difference in means of coefficients of the two indices (after drawing 10,000 simulated values of the model parameters), we conclude that there is a significant difference between the coefficients of the two indices, but the difference is not large enough to change the interpretation of the previous tables and figures.

Discussion and Conclusions

There is no doubt that political corruption affects individual behaviour and how people position themselves towards politics, whether we are talking about their support for political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003) or trust in politicians and the general system (Chang and Chu, 2006; Morris and Klesner, 2010). When it comes to people's electoral behaviour, the previous studies have shown that corruption leads to a smaller vote turnout, alienating and disentangling citizens from electoral politics (Davis *et al.*, 2004; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2011), but there are contradictory findings on how it affects the electoral support for a party. This paper aimed to test how corruption affects voting decision by analysing its conditional effect on ideological, economic, party or leader effects -based vote. In a nutshell, corruption has an indirect effect on corruption through its cross-level interaction with the key predictors of voting behaviour (ideological distance between the party and the voters and their party evaluations), but there is no clear evidence of a direct effect, at least on the probability of voting for the incumbent.

The previous contradictory findings that voters may punish the incumbent if accused of corruption, but also support it despite the allegations of corruption when they are partisans of that party or there are clientelistic benefits they receive from the government, cancel each other out in my initial model (Model 1 – Table1) and the direct effect of corruption is not significantly statistic in predicting the vote for the PM party. Moreover, as Dutch(2001) argued, when individuals do not trust politicians, they are more reluctant to change the incumbent with new self-seeking politicians, who would change the status-quo only for their interest. Controlling for additional variables measuring the individual evaluations of how corrupt the government officials are or whether they should be removed from power, and an indicator of how frequent the clientelistic practices are in the country, would give a better picture of the direct effect of corruption. In addition, the political culture in the country is an important contextual aspect that alters individual response to corruption. The way people perceive corruption – whether it is illegal or not, or they see it as an immoral practice, changes their attitudes towards allegations of political corruptions (Canache and Allison, 2005), and consequentially their decisions on whether to punish the government for it.

Despite the lack of all these extra variables, the models in the analysis help testing the indirect effect of corruption on voting decision through its impact on leader or party effects or the magnitude of economic and ideological vote. After

discussing the regression results in Table 2 and Figures 2-8, the conclusions are that corruption shapes the impact of the ideological distance from the incumbent and also of the party evaluations, but the cross-level interaction effect is really small and does not change much the predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent, hence the election's results. Corruption makes people adopt their voting strategies to the new conditions, but this indirect effect on voting decision must be seen in strong connection to the ambivalence-generating direct effect of corruption (discussed above). Ideological considerations weight less in voting decision¹⁰. When future seems unpredictable and self-oriented politicians are in power, voters believe less in policy programs and the Downsian distance is less important in the vote strategy.

The repercussion of corruption in alienating and disentangling citizens from electoral politics is reflected in the loss in intensity of party effects in contexts with a high level of corruption. This effect is still small and does not remarkably influence the probability of voting for the incumbent. Despite the lack of statistical significance, the plots of the marginal effect of party evaluations by level of corruption show that corruption has a diminishing effect only when the evaluations are positive, and the opposite effect when the evaluations are negative, or smaller than the country mean. This means that, when voters change the negative feelings towards a party in a context dominated by mistrust and lack of confidence in institutions, this weights more than it would in a country with no perceived corruption. In contrast, when voters already appreciate a party, an increase in their evaluations in high-corrupted countries, matter less than it would in non-corrupted countries. This goes well with the trust-repair argument, parties that manage to improve their negative image in a context with more and more alienated voters, get more votes. Facing a "choosing the lesser of two evils" dilemma, voters are more inclined to support the one that makes an effort. When they already hold good opinions about a party, an increase in party evaluations does not have the same impact because of the general distrust in political system.

The findings about the aftereffects of corruptions on leader effects are confusing. Their cross-level interaction effects is not statistically significant when we control for party effects, but the plots of the marginal effects show that overall an increased level of corruption boosts the impact leader evaluations have on vote choice; one unit increase in the evaluations of leader in highly corrupted environments raises the probability of voting for the incumbent by 8% compared to 5% in low-corrupted contexts. One example is Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and his electoral success despite the allegations of corruption. However, future research including all the CSES countries for Module 3 may indicate whether this is indeed a positive statistically significant change, or just a spurious effect because the main effects of corruption and leader effects, as well as the cross-level interaction effects are in the same direction.

¹⁰ The cross-level interaction between ideological distance and level of corruption remains statistically significant and at almost the same magnitude in all the models included, the same way as economic voting is statistically insignificant no matter what models it is included in.

Contrary to the expectations, economic vote is not affected by the level of corruption in the country. On one hand, the argument that a lack of trust generated by corruption would make people not consider changing the government (reward or punish it), because it would just change some self-interested politicians with others, may not be valid, thus the cross-level interaction effect is not significant. On the other hand, an economic vote seen as a selection model and not a sanction model, is applied in highly-corrupted countries, and positive evaluations would still give a high probability of the incumbent to remain in power, only that it would be for different reasons than in low-corrupted contexts. This takes us back to the “choosing the lesser of two evils” dilemma, voters trying to choose the better alternative – based on government performance evaluations this time.

The results on the difference in evaluations between leader and party could be called the main findings of the paper since the outcome in the regression table is backed up by the graphical display of the marginal effects. As previous studies already showed, the effects of leader and party evaluations are interrelated. If voters evaluate less one of them, the probability of voting for the party is smaller. It is also known that party/leader evaluations are endogenous to the leader/party effects on vote choice (we saw that in Model3). Model 4 showed that indeed, as the difference between the two increases, the probability of voting for the incumbent declines. However, the decline is smaller when the level of corruption is higher and especially when party leader is the one that has better evaluations (Figure 9). This fact indicates that the person matters more than the institution in environments dominated by political distrust and uncertainty specific to high-corrupted countries. Institutions are more rigid in creating bonds with voters; the one-to-one trust relationship works better between voters and politicians, than voters and parties as entities. And whether one of them is more appreciated by voters, this should be the leader in order to benefit. The new “politics on TV” era, where leaders spend more and more time in front of the cameras, give voters the illusion that they get to know and bond with them in a one-to-one base.

Appendix 1

Variables in Model

- VOTE CHOICE:** - (vote for prime minister party) - only coded for respondents who gave a valid answer regarding their vote in the last national election (upper house elections in Japan(2007) and Poland(2007), for those who did not give a valid answer regarding their vote in the elections to the lower house(almost half of the respondents); presidential in Brazil(2006) and Mexico(2006) ; elections to the lower or only house of parliament elsewhere. It is coded 1 when their vote choice is the prime minister (or president for Brazil and Mexico) party, and 0 otherwise.
- PARTY EVALUATION:** measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 = strongly dislike and 10 = strongly like as a response to Q9[a:i] in the CSES survey (*I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is [PARTY A].*) Responses are selected according to the party that has the Prime Minister in power.
- LEADER EVALUATION:** - measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 = strongly dislike and 10 = strongly like as a response to Q10[a:i] in the CSES survey (*And what do you think of the presidential candidates/party leaders? After I read the name of a presidential candidate/party leader, please rate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that candidate and 10 means that you strongly like that candidate. If I come to a presidential candidate/party leader you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first is [LEADER A].*) Responses are selected according to the party that has the Prime Minister in power.
- GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION:** measures the response regarding respondent's evaluations of government performance in general (*Q6. Now thinking about the performance of the [government in [CAPITAL]/president] in general, how good or bad a job do you think the [government/president in [CAPITAL]] has done over the past [NUMBER OF YEARS SINCE LAST GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE, BEFORE THE CURRENT ELECTION] years? Has [it/he/she] done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?*) The initial 4-point scales (from 4=very bad to 1=very good) was reverted so the high values would measure positive evaluations and category 6=regular (more or less) was included in the 2=good job category for Mexico(2009).
- IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE:** measures the distance between the prime minister/president party and the respondent based on the formula: ideological distance = | respondent left-right self-placement - party left-right position|. Respondent's left-right self-placement is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 = left and 10 = right as a response to Q24 in the CSES survey (*"In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?"*). Left-right self-placement was substituted with a Progressive-Conservative self-placement in the Japanese survey (*"Regarding the government, sometimes the terms Progressive and Conservative are used.*

Please rank yourself on a 0-10 scale with 0 being most progressive and 10 being most conservative. "). Party left-right position is also measured on the same type of scale as a response to Q11a-I in the CSES survey (*In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [PARTY A] on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*). Progressive-Conservative scale used in the Japanese survey.

AGE: - the age of the respondent in years;

EDUCATION LOW: coded 1 for primary education or less and 0 otherwise;

EDUCATION HIGH: coded 1 for university education or more and 0 otherwise;

INCOME: personal income, divided into quintiles (from 0=lowest to 4=highest) by election;

MALE: coded 1 for men and 0 for women;

URBAN: coded 1 for suburbs of large town or cities and large towns or city and 0 for rural area or village and small or middle-sized town.

CORRUPTION.WB – index developed by the World Bank to “capture perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2010, see <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf> for the sources used to create the index). It includes responses from expert and public surveys. The initial index was rescaled to a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 for the least corrupted countries in the sample, and 10 for the most corrupted ones.

CORRUPTION.TI – index developed by Transparency International draws on different assessments and business opinion surveys and captures information about the administrative and political aspects of corruption. It includes questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. It is initially measured on a 0-10 scale (TI, 2011), but was rescaled to a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 for the least corrupted countries in the sample, and 10 for the most corrupted ones.

PRESIDENTIAL – coded 1 for presidential regime, 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

PARLIAMENTARY - coded 1 for parliamentary regime, 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

OPEN LIST – coded 1 for systems where voters vote only party lists and those are open (e.g. voters can order, choose candidate within the list), 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

CLOSED LIST - coded 1 for systems where voters vote only party lists and those are closed (predefined by the party before the elections), 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

MAJORITYTARIAN – coded 1 if the country uses a majoritarian formula in all of its electoral segments, 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

PR - coded 1 if the country uses a proportional representation formula in all of its electoral segments, 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

NEW DEMOCRACY – coded 1 if the country has less than 20 years of democratic experience, 0 otherwise (CSES Macro-dataset);

Appendix 2

Table 1 – Goodness of Fit and Likelihood ratio chi-square tests of the expected random effects of individual level predictors on vote choice

Model	AIC	BIC	logLik	deviance	Significance of random effects		
					Chi ²	DF	
Baseline Model	22106	22122	-11051	22102			
Individual level Model	13876	13971	-6926	13852			
Model1(WB)	13509	13809	-6716	13433			
Model1 - RE of party evaluations	13700	13953	-6818	13636	203	6	***
Model1 – RE of leader evaluations	13508	13760	-6722	13444	10.9	6	*
Model1 – RE of ideological distance	13601	13854	-6769	13537	105	6	***
Model1 – RE of government evaluations	13559	13812	-6748	13495	62.4	6	***

***: p≤.01,**: p≤.05,*: p≤.10

Table 2: The Impact of Corruption on Vote for the Incumbent

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fixed Effects				
Intercept	-1.685*** (0.184)	-1.809*** (0.219)	-1.733*** (0.191)	-1.365*** (0.169)
Government Evaluation	0.323*** (0.039)	0.338*** (0.086)	0.352*** (0.083)	1.160*** (0.154)
Ideological Distance	0.242*** (0.013)	0.260*** (0.031)	0.260*** (0.031)	0.408*** (0.035)
Leader Evaluation	0.161*** (0.013)	0.134*** (0.017)	0.158*** (0.021)	
Party Evaluation	0.528*** (0.015)	0.569*** (0.044)	0.512*** (0.015)	
Leader-Party Evaluation				0.102 (0.108)
(Leader-Party Evaluation) ²				-0.041*** (0.010)
Corruption.WB	0.125 (0.100)	0.291*** (0.104)	0.157 (0.102)	0.149* (0.087)
Cross-level Interactions				
Gov Evaluation * Corruption		0.019 (0.025)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.045)
Ideol Distance * Corruption		-0.016* (0.009)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.010)
Leader Evaluation * Corruption		0.006 (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)	
Party Evaluation * Corruption		-0.041*** (0.013)		
(Leader-Party) * Corruption				0.029** (0.014)
Random Effects (Variance)				
Intercept	0.753	1.068	0.813	0.639
Party Evaluation		0.037		
Leader Evaluation		0.002	0.006	
Government Evaluation		0.124	0.114	0.512
Ideological Distance		0.017	0.018	0.024
Leader-Party				0.039
Log-likelihood	-6920.395	-6716.471	-6818.140	-8461.219
Deviance	13840.790	13432.941	13636.280	16922.437
AIC	13880.790	13508.941	13700.280	16986.437
N	19658	19658	19658	19658
Groups	23	23	23	23

***: $p \leq .01$; **: $p \leq .05$; *: $p \leq .10$


**Table 3: The Impact of Corruption on Vote for the Incumbent
Corruption(WB) vs. Corruption(TI)**

	Model 1(WB)	Model 1(TI)	Model 2(WB)	Model 2(TI)
Fixed Effects				
Intercept	-1.685*** (0.184)	-1.685*** (0.186)	-1.809*** (0.219)	-1.809*** (0.217)
Government evaluation	0.323*** (0.039)	0.323*** (0.039)	0.338*** (0.086)	0.339*** (0.086)
Ideological distance	0.242*** (0.013)	0.242*** (0.013)	0.260*** (0.031)	0.259*** (0.031)
Leader effects	0.161*** (0.013)	0.161*** (0.013)	0.134*** (0.017)	0.134*** (0.017)
Party effects	0.528*** (0.015)	0.528*** (0.015)	0.569*** (0.044)	0.569*** (0.043)
Corruption	0.125 (0.100)	0.095 (0.091)	0.291*** (0.104)	0.229** (0.095)
Cross-level Interactions				
Gov Evaluation * Corruption			0.019 (0.025)	0.022 (0.023)
Ideol Distance * Corruption			-0.016* (0.009)	-0.014* (0.008)
Leader Evaluation * Corruption			0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Party Evaluation * Corruption			-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.011)
Random Effects (Variance)				
Intercept	0.753	0.767	1.068	1.049
Party Evaluation			0.037	0.036
Leader Evaluation			0.002	0.002
Government Evaluation			0.124	0.122
Ideological Distance			0.017	0.017
Log-likelihood	-6920.395	-6920.607	-6716.471	-6716.244
Deviance	13840.790	13841.214	13432.941	13432.488
AIC	13880.790	13881.214	13508.941	13508.488
N	19658	19658	19658	19658
Groups	23	23	23	23


***: $p \leq .01$; **: $p \leq .05$; *: $p \leq .10$

Figure 1 – Across country variation of random effects


1A. Economic Vote vs. Corruption



1B. Ideological Vote vs. Corruption



1C. Party Effects vs. Corruption



1D. Leader Effects vs. Corruption






Figure 2. Marginal Effect on Vote Choice by Level of Corruption (Model 2)

Impact calculated for one unit increase from the country mean


2A. Marginal Effect of Party Evaluations



2B. Marginal Effect of Leader Evaluations



2C. Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance



2D. Marginal Effect of Government Evaluation:






Figure 3. Marginal Effect on Vote Choice by Level of Corruption (Model 2)

Impact calculated for one unit increase from the min


3A. Marginal Effect of Party Evaluations



3B. Marginal Effect of Leader Evaluations



3C. Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance



3D. Marginal Effect of Government Evaluation:






Figure 4. Marginal Effect on Vote Choice by Level of Corruption (Model 2)

Impact calculated for one unit increase to the max


4A. Marginal Effect of Party Evaluations



4B. Marginal Effect of Leader Evaluations



4C. Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance



4D. Marginal Effect of Government Evaluation:




Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent(Model 2)




Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent




Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent (Model 2)




Figure 8. Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent(Model 2)





Figure 9. Marginal Effect of the difference on Vote Choice by Level of Corruption (Model4)


9A. Party–Max, Leader–Min



9B. Leader–Max, Party–Min



Figure 10. Predicted probabilities of Voting for the Incumbent(Model 4)



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