

# National identity and attitudes towards the EU

By

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## 1. Introduction

This paper focuses on the effects of group identity, mainly national identity, on attitudes towards European Integration.

Most early studies explained preferences over European Integration in terms of its economic consequences, whether these were focused on individual attributes or economic perceptions (on individual as well as group utility). In the last decade, however, there is growing literature that argues that citizen preferences on European integration might be, notwithstanding economic determinants, more importantly driven by group attachments, that is by the loyalties, values, and norms that define who a person is. This more recent literature has focused mainly on the effect of national identity on preferences over European integration and, though in most of these studies national identity is found to be a powerful predictor, there are contradictory results on whether its net effect is positive or negative. Drawing on the previous literature and using a comparative method, our paper tries to address some of the following research questions: Under what conditions does national identity have a positive –or negative– effect on preferences over European integration? Drawing on the concept of *double allegiance* (De Vries and van Kersbergen 2007) we will examine how perceptions of benefit (economic or otherwise) of the country's membership of the EU affects the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the EU and how the latter can change over time.

In section 2 of the paper we revise the existing literature on attitudes towards the EU in order to establish our hypotheses on the relation between national identity and EU attachment in different context and conditions. In Section 3 we discuss our selection of cases, our models and our empirical results which lead to a short section to show our main conclusions.

## **2. ¿Is it economic rationality, national identity or a combination of both?**

Explanations of attitudes towards the European Union (EU) have been largely grouped in two schools: economic utility related factors or national identity related factors (see de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007: 310 or Hooghe and Marks 2005 for good explanations of both approaches).

### *Approaches from economic rationality explanations to attitudes towards the EU*

Most early approaches to EU attitudes were based upon economics. Analysts have argued that the generation of an integrated European market has had significant effects on citizens' material well-being, with some citizens clearly benefiting more than others. Economic approaches – variously referred to as economic instrumentalism, economic rationality or economic utilitarianism – assume that citizens engage in a cost–benefit calculation whereby citizens who gain, or expect to gain, from economic integration will be supportive of the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichter, 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel 1998a and 1998b among others). One set of studies has, accordingly, investigated the impact of individual-level economic traits (levels of human capital relating to education, occupation, income, etc.) on views of the integration process. The reasoning here is that citizens who are high in human capital are best placed to benefit from emerging market-related opportunities and are therefore likely to be positively disposed to integration (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a; Inglehart, 1970). Citizens perceive benefits or losses from the EU depending on their capability to take opportunities from market liberalization. In this respect there is some consensus in the literature that higher educational attainment, higher labor market qualifications and higher income are all positively related to attitudes towards the EU (Gabel 1998a and 1998b).

A second approach within this school has focused on the effects of individual subjective perceptions of the economy, at both the national/sociotropic and the individual level (Anderson, 1998; Christin, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993), on attitudes in favor of EU integration. This is why, further below in our analysis, we have controlled by both evaluations of the national and individual economic situation.

A third approach within this school has focused on the national rather than individual level, trying to assess the relationship between attitudes to integration and macro-level economic indicators, such as being a net beneficiary of EU funding, having high levels of trade with European partners or other national economic characteristics (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Díez Medrano, 2003; Brinegar et al., 2004; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). We will come back again to this third approach below.

*Approaches from national identity explanations to attitudes towards the EU*

As said, a second, more recent, group of theories has put a greater emphasis on cultural or identity factors, paying attention in particular to the effect of national identity on attitudes towards the EU. Following this second argument, parallel to their economic rationality, humans also have an emotional capacity for intense group loyalty and such loyalties can be extremely powerful in shaping views toward political objects (Citrin and Sides 1990). The identity approach assumes that it is not material well-being that is of primary significance but psychological well-being, particularly the importance of feeling part of a social group, especially a national group. Accordingly, several analysts have demonstrated that group loyalties and attachments are significant predictors of attitudes towards the EU

The strongest territorial identities are national (Hooghe and Marks, 2005) and over the last decade a good number of studies have examined the effect of national identity on shaping either attitudes towards EU integration (Carey, 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Llamazares and Gramacho, 2007; de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007), or on European identity itself (Inglehart 1970, 1971; Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Díez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Díez Medrano, 2003; Duchesne and Frogner 2008). Hooghe and Marks (2005: 417), for instance, find that national identity explains a greater variance in support to European Integration than egotropic or sociotropic economic evaluation.

Even though there is some agreement on the effect of national identity on attitudes towards European integration there is some disagreement on whether that effect is positive or negative. A first group of scholar understands the process of European Integration in a similar fashion to the building-up of the different nation-states in the

XIX Century. Following this first approach, support to EU integration or European identity competes with national identity for citizens' group loyalties, and therefore the expectation is that national identities and attitudes towards the EU will be negatively correlated (Smith 1992; Dogan, 1994; Mayer, 1997; Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2006; see Duchesne y Frogner, 2008: 45-146 for a throughout discussion of this approach). Furthermore, within this first approach there is the argument that the Treaty of Maastricht and subsequent treaties have underlined the political dimension of the integration process, thus giving greater salience to the symbolic-political factors in relation to economic criteria (Carey 2002: 390). Thus, the hypothesis follows that individuals with a stronger national identity will also have more negative attitudes towards the EU, since European Integration erodes national sovereignty. Along these lines, using data from the Eurobarometer 2000, Carey (2002: 397) found a negative relationship between national pride and attitudes towards EU integration. Some of the studies within this first approach do not look at national identity (or national pride), but use national identity-related indicators as independent variables such as fear of cultural threat (McLaren, 2002) and suspicion of immigrants or xenophobic attitudes (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Garry and Tilley, 2009) as predictors of a Eurosceptical position.

Within this same school, a second group of scholars argue that territorial identities might complement one another and work in the same direction, so that *in certain circumstances*, national identity might reinforce attitudes towards the EU. Following this second approach, citizens may simultaneously hold different and multiple mutually compatible identities. Diez Medrano (2003) was one of the first scholars to work in this direction through the concept of *nested identities*: citizens may feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European-at one and the same time. Following his argument, identities are compatible when they fulfill different functions, and this depends on each identity's meaning or content. The positive correlation between national and European identity (or attitudes towards the EU) depends on the way Europe is *framed* in different contexts, with the result that the EU might be seen as a threat in certain contexts but not in others (Diez Medrano, 2003: 759). In a similar vein, De Vries and Van Kersbergen have used the concept of *double allegiance* to explain how national and European identity might reinforce one another in a given context. Following their argument, security and welfare (in their widest sense) are the principal

benefits that governments bestow upon citizens. These, in turn, support decisions and governmental actions that escape from their direct control on condition that their handing over of decisional power to a supranational level will guarantee and/or reinforce their security and welfare in a territorial, psychological, social or economic way. This is, following their argument, the basis of the concept of *double allegiance*: secondary allegiance to supranational institutions is rooted in citizens' primary allegiance to their respective nation. Thus, support to the EU depends on the national elites' capability to provide (in different contexts) political, social or economic welfare through supranational institutions (De Vries y van Kersbergen 2007:312-3; van Kersbergen 2000: 4-9). Thus, the concept of *double allegiance* can explain variation in the relationship between national identity and adherence to the EU both across space and time, so when citizens perceive that European integration may become an obstacle to the provision of security and welfare we might expect no relationship (or a negative one) between national identity and adherence to the EU. Following De Vries y van Kersbergen (2007:312, 324) the concept of *double allegiance* gathers in one single explanatory framework both the utilitarian and the national identity explanations of attitudes towards the EU. We will come back to this below.

If the relationship between national identity and allegiance to the EU is dependent on how Europe is framed or in the elite's capability to present that belonging to the EU provides benefits (in different contexts), then how can we generalize about the effects of national identity on allegiance to the EU? One third approach within this school tries to establish generalizations through the basic distinction between *exclusive* and *inclusive* national identities. Thus, citizens who perceive their national identity as *exclusive* in relation to other territorial identities (whether European or subnational) will tend to be more Eurosceptical than those that perceive them in *inclusive* terms (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 416-7; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007: 215). Additionally, when national elites are divided over European Integration, there is greater space for mobilization of national identity against the EU, and the negative effect of exclusive identities on attitudes towards the EU will be even greater. On the contrary where there is no division of elites over European Integration, national identity (even defined in exclusive terms) will have no effect on attitudes towards the EU, or that effect might even be positive (Hooghe y Marks, 2005: 417).

*¿A combination from the two approaches?*

Given this recent rise in the influence of identity-based theories, some studies have sought to identify whether it is the economic- or identity-based approach that is *most* influential in determining attitudes. Several analysts have operationalized both theoretical approaches in the same modeling exercise in order to assess the relative importance of each (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2004). These analyses certainly serve the purpose of demonstrating that *both* the economic and identity approaches are important contributors to our understanding of what drives EU attitudes. However, it could be argued that pitching the economic and identity approaches against each other – with the aim of the analysis to assess which of the two approaches performs ‘best’ – is perhaps somewhat limiting. Along the lines of the argument based upon the concept of *double allegiance*, and following the work done by Garry and Tilley (2009) we explore the hypothesis that the strength of the relationship between identity factors and attitudes to integration will vary according to the economic conditions of the state in which citizens reside. In line with previous research (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2004, 2006) Garry and Tilley (2009), found that citizens with an exclusive sense of national identity will tend to hold sceptical views of the EU. However, in their work they also find macroeconomic conditioning effects. Specifically, Garry and Tilley (2009: 367) find that citizens who reside in states that are net contributors to the EU are particularly likely to have views on the EU that are shaped by their exclusive identity. Essentially, citizens living in net contributor states have no national-level economic incentive to hold in check the impact of their exclusive identity on their attitudes to integration. This is because in such states citizens’ identity-related concerns will not be offset by funds arriving from the EU; rather, their concerns will be augmented by the fact that the EU is effectively redistributing the taxes of their national group to other national groups. This is in contrast with the incentives for citizens in net beneficiary countries to ‘swallow their national pride’ in order to benefit from funding arriving from the EU (Garry and Tilley 2009: 367-368).

The level of net financial benefits from the EU has been used in previous research as a direct predictor of positive evaluations of integration. Mahler et al. (2000:


440) demonstrate a 'strong relationship' between net budgetary transfers and support for integration. Explaining this robust relationship, Mahler et al. state that 'although national costs and benefits from membership occur in a number of spheres, the EU's budgetary relationship with its members is among those most unambiguously linked in the public mind to the EU as an institution' (2000: 440). However, the effect of EU funding on the net beneficiaries' public opinions is not immediate. As the recent research on Poland case suggests (Jackson et. al 2011) the public opinion perception of benefits coming from the EU took some time from the moment of the country's accession in 2003 until the end that decade, a period of time in which, consequently, support to European Integration increased substantially. Likewise, Perez-Nievas and Mata Lopez (forthcoming) have found for the Spanish case that the positive relationship between national identity and positive attitudes towards the EU was far stronger in the 2000's in relation to the early 1990's when the perception of benefits coming from the EU was not quite so firmly established among public opinion.

Drawing on all this previous research, in the next section we explore the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the EU.

### **3. Selection of cases, hypotheses and results.**

Taking into account the economic approach that focuses on macroeconomic conditions the national level, we have selected two net contributor cases (West Germany and the Netherlands) and two net beneficiaries (Spain and Portugal) to explore the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the EU. In order to add greater variation we explore two points in time, 1994 and 2006. Graph 1 shows that in 1993 there is an important drop in the GDP growth in the four countries that we are studying, whereas in 2006 all of them experience a period of growth in their GDPs.

Graph 1: German, Netherlander, Portuguese and Spanish GDP (1988-2010) <sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> The data show the GDP growth (annual %) Source: World Databank

Following our revised theory above, perceptions of country benefits from being part of the EU are an important part of our model. Drawing on the concept of double allegiance, perceptions of benefits seem to intermediate between national identity and positive attitudes towards the EU. In Graphs from 2 to 5 we show the evolution of perception of benefit from each country’s membership (%t of those who think the country has benefited from EU membership) in relation to positive attitudes towards the EU. If we look at the case of Spain in Graph 5, in the early 1990’s there was a much higher percentage of respondents who thought that the EU was a good thing than those who thought that Spain’s membership of the EU was beneficial for the country. This is similar to the pattern found by Jackson et. al (2011) for the case of Poland. That is, the effect of EU funding on the net beneficiaries’ public perceptions of country benefit is not immediate. This is not, however, the pattern we see in Portugal, the only case out of the four countries where the perception of country benefit is higher than the positive attitudes toward EU, during the whole period analyzed. Both in the case of Spain and

Portugal we see an important drop in both values around 1994. In the case of Germany (Graph 2) there was a downward trend in both values in the early 1990's rather than a sudden drop in the case of the two net beneficiaries. The Netherlands (Graph 3) show a rather flat pattern that remained in high values (the highest of all four cases) for the whole period.


Graphs 2 to 5 suggest there is a relationship between perceptions of country benefit and attitudes toward the EU, and that this relationship changes in different contexts. Additionally there is the question of the effects of national identity (positive or negative) on attitudes towards the EU. Does the perception of country benefit play an intermediating role in those effects? And is it that role different in net contributor countries in relation to net beneficiary countries? And is it different in times of economic crisis (1994) from times of economic growth (2006)? We now proceed to propose some hypotheses and then, to try to answer those questions we build a series of models through logistic regression analysis.

**H1.** It is more likely to find a positive relation between national identity and attitudes towards the EU in all four countries in times of economic growth (2006) than in times of economic crisis (1994).


**H2.** It is more likely to find a positive relation between national identity and attitudes towards the EU in the two net beneficiary countries given the role played by net budgetary transfers in public perceptions (Mahler et al. 2000).

**H2a** This will be so particularly in 2006, given public opinion's perception of funding coming from the EU in 2006 in relation to 1994 (too early after accession for Spain and Portugal for this perception to take hold)


Graph 2: Attitudes toward EU and perception of benefit in Germany




Graph 3: Attitudes toward EU and perception of benefit in The Netherlands



Graph 4: Attitudes toward EU and perception of benefit in Portugal



Graph 5: Attitudes toward EU and perception of benefit in Spain



Source: Standard Euro barometers

**H3.** We expect the perception of benefit to play an intermediating role between national identity and attitudes towards the EU, particularly in the net beneficiary countries, and particularly in 2006, for the reasons mentioned above.

**H4.** We expect a negative relationship between exclusive national identity and attitudes towards the EU in the four countries.

**H4.1** A related counterhypothesis, in net beneficiary countries there will be no relationship between exclusive identity and attitudes towards the EU (or this may even turn positive) when we take into account the perception of country benefit

*Data and variables:*

To test our hypothesis we use the eurobarometers 42 (The first year of the new EU, 1994) and 66.1 (European values and social issues, 2006). Both of them have similar questions about EU membership, which allows us to compare the results.

To measure the attitudes toward the EU (our dependent variable) we have chosen the question that taps satisfaction with membership. The wording of this question is:

*Generally speaking, do you think that [your country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

As what we are interested in is positive attitudes toward EU, we have recoded this into a dichotomic variable: (1) positive attitude (EU is a good thing) (0) others (EU is a bad thing, or neither good nor bad).

In relation to our key independent variables, we are going to work with four questions:

*Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY)?*

*Taking everything into account would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU?*

*In the near future do you see yourself as (NATIONALITY only), (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY), European only? (eurobarometer 42) /*

*Do you ever think of yourself as not only (NATIONALITY), but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never? (eurobarometer 66.1)*

The first one measures the national identity. We have recoded it as a variable with four levels from 1 (not at all proud) to 4 (very proud). The second is the one we use to measure the perception of benefit, and we have recoded it as a dichotomic variable: (1) benefited, (0) not benefited. Finally, in relation with the two last questions, they have different wording in the two barometers. So we have recoded both into a dichotomic variable that measures the same thing in both cases: (1) only nationality (0) others.

Table 1: Support, perception benefit and national identity (exclusive or not) <sup>a</sup>

	NETHERLANDS		GERMANY		SPAIN		PORTUGAL	
	1994	2006	1994	2006	1994	2006	1994	2006
Attitudes toward EU								
Good thing	0,79	0,71	0,65	0,60	0,51	0,75	0,58	0,48
Not good thing	0,21	0,29	0,35	0,40	0,49	0,25	0,42	0,52
Membership benefits								
Benefited	0,80	0,67	0,64	0,55	0,41	0,67	0,76	0,63
Not benefited	0,20	0,33	0,36	0,45	0,59	0,33	0,24	0,37
National identity								
Proud	0,73	0,87	0,56	0,75	0,87	0,90	0,90	0,87
Not proud	0,27	0,13	0,44	0,25	0,13	0,10	0,10	0,13
Exclusive national identity								
Yes	0,33	0,41	0,29	0,39	0,33	0,44	0,44	0,41
Not	0,67	0,59	0,71	0,61	0,67	0,56	0,56	0,59

<sup>a</sup> Data reflect the percentage of respondents that assert thinking that being member of the EU is a good thing, that this membership has benefits for the country, that are proud to be from their country, and that have an exclusive national identity.

Source: Eurobarometers 42 and 66.1

Apart from our key independent variables, we include some control ones in our models, these are in full: age, sex, age, years of education, occupation and perceptions of the economy, at both the national/sociotropic and the individual level<sup>1</sup>.

### *Models:*

We have built two models for each year and for each country, what makes four models per country. The idea is, first of all built one model which includes one of our key independent variables that measures identity, whether is only national identity (measured as pride of being from her/his country) or exclusive national identity. And in the second model, add the variable of perception of benefit in order to check if there is any changes in the coefficients of the national identity variable.

Taking this into account we have the next two pair of models for each country:

- Model A1 (National identity): In this model we check if there is any significant relationship between the national identity and the attitudes toward EU.
- Model A2 (National identity + Country benefit): Here we verify if there is any influence of the country benefit in the relationship between national identity and attitudes toward EU.
- Model B1 (Exclusive national identity): In this model we check if there is any significant relationship between having a exclusive national identity and the attitudes toward EU.
- Model B2 (Exclusive national identity + Country benefit): Here we verify that this relationship is still significant when we add the country benefit.

### Results

Results of Table 2 reflect that, with regard to the Netherlands we find a positive relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the EU only in 1994. But this effect is not significant when we add the country benefit. Furthermore, as just said national identity has no effect in attitudes towards the EU in 2006, precisely when we

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<sup>1</sup> In 2006 there are no questions about retrospective evaluations so we have been forced to use prospective evaluations.

most expected it. Exclusive national identity has a negative impact on EU attitudes (both in 1994 and 2006), weather we take into account perception of country benefit or not.

Table 2: Regression models in Netherlands <sup>a</sup>.

	1994				2006			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2
Gender	0,042 (0,240)	0,031 (0,296)	-0,033 (0,227)	-0,068 (0,283)	-0,181 (0,167)	-0,015 (0,206)	-0,115 (0,174)	0,055 (0,211)
Age	-0,016 (0,009)	-0,015 (0,011)	-0,014 (0,008)	-0,016 (0,011)	-0,001 (0,007)	0,000 (0,009)	-0,002 (0,008)	0,002 (0,009)
Studies (years of)	<b>0,062*</b> <b>(0,030)</b>	0,011 (0,036)	0,056 (0,029)	0,015 (0,036)	0,012 (0,011)	0,009 (0,013)	0,005 (0,010)	0,008 (0,013)
Occupation <sup>b</sup>								
Student	-0,307 (0,488)	-0,076 (0,639)	-0,270 (0,479)	-0,069 (0,629)	<b>1,126*</b> <b>(0,515)</b>	1,067 (0,616)	<b>1,096*</b> <b>(0,535)</b>	1,227 (0,626)
Unemployed	0,707 (0,684)	0,624 (0,764)	0,192 (0,612)	0,173 (0,697)	0,138 (0,521)	-0,346 (0,609)	0,078 (0,546)	-0,305 (0,632)
Retired	-0,023 (0,363)	0,152 (0,450)	-0,122 (0,348)	0,156 (0,441)	0,410 (0,302)	0,491 (0,376)	0,377 (0,315)	0,483 (0,380)
Skilled Manual Worker	-0,631 (0,776)	-0,968 (0,847)	-0,645 (0,806)	-0,939 (0,931)	0,055 (0,455)	-0,215 (0,554)	0,188 (0,472)	0,010 (0,566)
Other Manual Worker	-0,246 (0,471)	-0,220 (0,568)	-0,410 (0,447)	-0,434 (0,544)	-0,018 (0,642)	0,121 (0,760)	0,379 (0,670)	0,436 (0,778)
Desk and services	0,009 (0,342)	0,123 (0,420)	-0,170 (0,328)	-0,097 (0,399)	0,243 (0,291)	0,328 (0,357)	0,229 (0,302)	0,388 (0,359)
Farmer/ Fisherman	-1,819 (1,291)	-2,252 (1,370)	-2,594 (1,289)	-2,927 (1,373)				
Shopowner/ craftsmen					0,025 (0,617)	-0,009 (0,813)	-0,196 (0,640)	-0,127 (0,750)
Middle Management General	-0,288 (0,405)	-0,199 (0,474)	-0,352 (0,396)	-0,302 (0,471)	<b>0,751*</b> <b>(0,340)</b>	<b>0,842*</b> <b>(0,411)</b>	<b>0,749*</b> <b>(0,352)</b>	<b>0,874*</b> <b>(0,411)</b>
Management/ Professionals	0,020 (0,454)	0,158 (0,549)	-0,393 (0,439)	-0,318 (0,534)	0,681 (0,377)	0,705 (0,456)	0,423 (0,390)	0,499 (0,465)
Economic situation	<b>0,370**</b> <b>(0,107)</b>	<b>0,350***</b> <b>(0,131)</b>	<b>0,279**</b> <b>(0,102)</b>	0,224 (0,127)	0,476 (0,117)	<b>0,309*</b> <b>(0,141)</b>	<b>0,459***</b> <b>(0,122)</b>	<b>0,309*</b> <b>(0,144)</b>
Financial situation	0,042 (0,122)	-0,069 (0,151)	-0,002 (0,119)	-0,150 (0,147)	0,194 (0,135)	0,086 (0,161)	0,162 (0,140)	0,093 (0,163)
Ideology	<b>-0,227***</b> <b>(0,052)</b>	<b>-0,139*</b> <b>(0,064)</b>	<b>-0,180***</b> <b>(0,049)</b>	-0,108 (0,061)	-0,080* (0,040)	-0,065 (0,049)	-0,063 (0,042)	-0,052 (0,050)
National Identity (pride)	<b>0,505*</b> <b>(0,209)</b>	0,049 (0,269)			0,335 (0,223)	0,381 (0,276)		
Exclusive Nationality			<b>-1,004***</b> <b>(0,192)</b>	<b>-1,037***</b> <b>(0,240)</b>			<b>-1,333***</b> <b>(0,160)</b>	<b>-1,028***</b> <b>(0,192)</b>
Country Benefit		<b>2,470***</b> <b>(0,249)</b>		<b>2,409**</b> <b>(0,239)</b>		<b>2,494***</b> <b>(0,189)</b>		<b>2,351***</b> <b>(0,194)</b>
Constant	0,867 (0,978)	0,031 (0,296)	1,937 (0,956)	-0,068 (0,283)	-0,776 (0,794)	-1,871 (0,971)	0,244 (0,808)	-1,273 (0,980)
X <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	69,863 (17)	170,210 (18)	89,050 (17)	195,989 (18)	65,926 (17)	267,09 (18)	136,55 (17)	299,29 (18)
- 2 Log verosimilitub	701,005	485,222	746,637	507,978	1038,33	738,435	975,744	713,25

<sup>a</sup> The data reflect multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Typical errors in brackets. Statistic significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ ; +  $p < 0,1$

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is Responsible for ordinary HH.

Source: eurobarometers 42 and 66.1

In the case of Germany (Table 3) we find that national identity has no effect on attitudes towards the EU, neither in 1994 nor in 2006. As expected exclusive national identity has a negative effect on EU attitudes, that are not influenced by the perception of country benefit neither in 1994 nor in 2006.

Table 3: Regression models in Germany <sup>a</sup>.

	1994				2006			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2
Gender	-0,119 (0,196)	<b>-0,747**</b> <b>(0,282)</b>	-0,056 (0,183)	-0,506 (0,260)	-0,318 (0,168)	<b>-0,475*</b> <b>(0,208)</b>	-0,212 (0,171)	<b>-0,415*</b> (0,210)
Age	0,011 (0,008)	0,016 (0,011)	0,016* (0,007)	0,019 (0,010)	0,007 (0,007)	0,013 (0,009)	0,005 (0,007)	0,012 (0,009)
Studies (years of)	0,014 (0,024)	-0,007 (0,030)	0,015 (0,022)	-0,004 (0,028)	<b>0,102***</b> <b>(0,023)</b>	<b>0,096**</b> <b>(0,028)</b>	<b>0,085***</b> <b>(0,023)</b>	<b>0,082**</b> <b>(0,028)</b>
Occupation <sup>b</sup>								
Student	0,090 (0,464)	-0,250 (0,634)	<b>-0,214*</b> <b>(0,431)</b>	-0,609 (0,593)	<b>1,832*</b> <b>(0,568)</b>	0,934 (0,674)	<b>1,925**</b> <b>(0,579)</b>	0,997 (0,690)
Unemployed	-0,794 (0,492)	-1,043 (0,693)	-1,071 (0,459)	<b>-1,596*</b> <b>(0,663)</b>	-0,406 (0,415)	-0,252 (0,502)	-0,106 (0,425)	-0,025 (0,507)
Retired	-0,649 (0,371)	-0,554 (0,535)	-0,641 (0,366)	-0,694 (0,529)	0,187 (0,345)	-0,205 (0,420)	0,381 (0,356)	-0,088 (0,432)
Skilled Manual Worker	<b>-1,140*</b> <b>(0,455)</b>	-0,965 (0,646)	-0,905 (0,438)	-0,556 (0,642)	0,001 (0,381)	-0,292 (0,469)	0,189 (0,391)	-0,225 (0,481)
Other Manual Worker	-0,564 (0,385)	-0,825 (0,531)	-0,402 (0,365)	-0,865 (0,507)	0,614 (0,494)	0,196 (0,629)	0,650 (0,492)	0,319 (0,630)
Desk and services	-0,133 (0,337)	-0,195 (0,472)	-0,238 (0,323)	-0,469 (0,450)	0,097 (0,317)	-0,615 (0,391)	0,231 (0,325)	-0,495 (0,409)
Farmer/Fisherman	<b>-2,439*</b> <b>(1,231)</b>	-1,562 (1,731)	-0,810 (0,881)	-0,752 (1,566)	0,539 (0,981)	-0,336 (1,370)	0,649 (1,026)	0,364 (1,172)
Shopowner and craftsmen	-0,542 (0,592)	-0,488 (0,758)	-0,323 (0,573)	-0,288 (0,717)	-0,352 (0,620)	-0,961 (0,776)	0,003 (0,637)	-0,749 (0,774)
Middle Management	0,181 (0,375)	0,443 (0,530)	-0,176 (0,344)	0,012 (0,483)	-0,063 (0,357)	-0,549 (0,437)	-0,111 (0,357)	-0,563 (0,445)
General Management/Professionals	-0,209 (0,425)	-0,507 (0,585)	-0,492 (0,395)	-0,717 (0,544)	0,343 (0,394)	-0,276 (0,483)	0,411 (0,395)	-0,268 (0,484)
Economic situation	<b>0,457***</b> <b>(0,106)</b>	<b>0,115</b> <b>(0,149)</b>	<b>0,414***</b> <b>(0,101)</b>	0,137 (0,140)	0,360** (0,116)	0,161 (0,143)	<b>0,375**</b> <b>(0,117)</b>	0,182 (0,143)
Financial situation	-0,129 (0,139)	-0,356 (0,194)	-0,118 (0,128)	<b>-0,380*</b> <b>(0,178)</b>	<b>0,524***</b> <b>(0,139)</b>	0,368 (0,168)	<b>0,411**</b> <b>(0,140)</b>	0,291 (0,169)
Ideology	-0,122* (0,051)	-0,082 (0,069)	<b>-0,111*</b> <b>(0,048)</b>	-0,105 (0,065)	-0,093 (0,045)	-0,086 (0,055)	-0,070 (0,045)	-0,055 (0,055)
National Identity (pride)	-0,194 (0,184)	-0,234 (0,255)			0,337 (0,182)	0,408 (0,220)		
Exclusive Nationality			<b>-1,584***</b> <b>(0,186)</b>	<b>-1,384***</b> <b>(0,246)</b>			<b>-1,051***</b> <b>(0,162)</b>	<b>-0,736***</b> <b>(0,198)</b>
Country Benefit		<b>3,126***</b> <b>(0,258)</b>	<b>3,025***</b> <b>(0,241)</b>			<b>2,615***</b> <b>(0,202)</b>	<b>2,582***</b> <b>(0,205)</b>	
Constant	0,237 (0,800)	1,210 (1,087)	0,325 (0,761)	1,282 (1,025)	-2,720 (0,776)	-2,940 (0,952)	-1,846 (0,785)	-2,227 (0,957)
X <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	48,727 (17)	236,034 (18)	123,72 (17)	329,795 (18)	112,27 (17)	317,28 (18)	153,72 (17)	339,338 (18)
- 2 Log verosimilitub	808,367	477,127	937,735	541,618	999,33	721,27	975,10	710,415

<sup>a</sup> The data reflect multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Typical errors in brackets. Statistic significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ ; +  $p < 0,1$

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is Responsible for ordinary HH.

Source: eurobarometers 42 and 66.1

Table 4: Regression models in Portugal <sup>a</sup>.

	1994				2006			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2
Gender	-0,088 (0,202)	-0,241 (0,234)	-0,089 (0,208)	-0,219 (0,240)	-0,172 (0,175)	-0,196 (0,232)	-0,076 (0,176)	-0,119 (0,233)
Age	-0,009 (0,008)	-0,002 (0,009)	-0,005 (0,008)	0,002 (0,009)	-0,010 (0,007)	0,002 (0,010)	-0,009 (0,007)	0,002 (0,010)
Studies (years of)	0,031 (0,024)	0,030 (0,028)	0,025 (0,025)	0,026 (0,029)	-0,005 (0,004)	-0,007 (0,006)	-0,004 (0,004)	-0,007 (0,006)
Occupation <sup>b</sup>								
Student	0,464 (0,512)	0,771 (0,624)	0,333 (0,523)	0,745 (0,641)	0,951 (0,575)	0,991 (0,742)	0,957 (0,583)	1,050 (0,746)
Unemployed	-0,234 (0,483)	-0,288 (0,581)	-0,212 (0,495)	-0,338 (0,562)	0,111 (0,423)	0,057 (0,553)	0,116 (0,429)	0,112 (0,553)
Retired	-0,155 (0,361)	-0,505 (0,436)	-0,082 (0,378)	-0,359 (0,451)	0,185 (0,355)	0,219 (0,474)	0,186 (0,360)	0,280 (0,478)
Skilled Manual Worker	-0,765 (0,421)	-0,795 (0,496)	<b>-0,892*</b> <b>(0,429)</b>	-0,832 (0,507)	-0,093 (0,399)	0,184 (0,531)	-0,145 (0,404)	0,210 (0,534)
Other Manual Worker	-0,665 (0,386)	-0,709 (0,455)	-0,671 (0,394)	-0,656 (0,462)	0,044 (0,418)	0,241 (0,555)	0,027 (0,427)	0,295 (0,562)
Desk and services	-0,610 (0,389)	-0,698 (0,461)	-0,533 (0,402)	-0,598 (0,474)	0,626 (0,421)	0,999 (0,582)	0,519 (0,425)	1,009 (0,584)
Farmer/Fisherman	0,094 (0,576)	-0,178 (0,705)	0,055 (0,573)	-0,064 (0,691)	0,730 (0,842)	2,337 (1,142)	0,978 (0,852)	2,484 (1,157)
Shopowner/craftsmen	-0,572 (0,389)	-0,732 (0,464)	-0,662 (0,403)	-0,761 (0,476)	0,799 (0,515)	0,867 (0,679)	0,820 (0,519)	0,980 (0,678)
Middle Management General	-0,264 (0,440)	-0,490 (0,525)	-0,467 (0,454)	-0,632 (0,542)	0,957 (0,500)	0,498 (0,625)	0,702 (0,504)	0,473 (0,626)
Management/Professionals	0,345 (0,484)	-0,129 (0,555)	0,166 (0,497)	-0,237 (0,559)	0,561 (0,483)	0,121 (0,595)	0,350 (0,488)	0,104 (0,598)
Economic situation	<b>0,522***</b> <b>(0,128)</b>	0,327 (0,150)	<b>0,525***</b> <b>(0,131)</b>	<b>0,362*</b> <b>(0,153)</b>	<b>0,560***</b> <b>(0,135)</b>	0,580 (0,181)	<b>0,634***</b> <b>(0,136)</b>	<b>0,594**</b> <b>(0,180)</b>
Financial situation	0,281 (0,147)	0,273 (0,174)	0,302 (0,150)	0,298 (0,177)	0,221 (0,162)	0,199 (0,215)	0,186 (0,161)	0,168 (0,214)
Ideology	-0,083 (0,049)	-0,099 (0,060)	-0,056 (0,050)	-0,081 (0,061)	0,023 (0,038)	-0,027 (0,051)	0,013 (0,039)	-0,035 (0,051)
National Identity (pride)	<b>0,686*</b> <b>(0,294)</b>	0,662 (0,348)			<b>0,703**</b> <b>(0,250)</b>	0,131 (0,353)		
Exclusive Nationality			<b>-1,110***</b> <b>(0,186)</b>	<b>-0,943***</b> <b>(0,217)</b>			<b>-0,691***</b> <b>(0,178)</b>	-0,270 (0,245)
Country Benefit		<b>2,558***</b> <b>(0,267)</b>		<b>2,442***</b> <b>(0,272)</b>		<b>3,686***</b> <b>(0,301)</b>		<b>3,660***</b> <b>(0,300)</b>
Constant	-1,426 (0,850)	-2,584 (1,006)	-0,610 (0,845)	-1,938 (1,007)	-1,412 (0,730)	-3,764 (1,032)	-0,698 (0,706)	-3,620 (0,988)
X <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	73,620 (17)	184,385 (17)	105,794 (17)	205,472 (18)	79,59 (17)	332,83 (18)	86,62 (17)	332,50 (18)
- 2 Log	765,407	591,745	729,543	569,737	856,70	545,49	850,66	546,31

<sup>a</sup> The data reflect multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Typical errors in brackets.

Statistic significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ ; +  $p < 0,1$

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is Responsible for ordinary HH.

Source: eurobarometers 42 and 66.1

Let us turn now to net beneficiary countries. In Portugal we find that national identity has a positive effect on EU attitudes both in 1994 and 2006. However, that effect seems intermediated by the perception of country benefit at both points in time. Exclusive identity has a negative impact on EU attitudes but there is no effect if we take into consideration perceptions of country benefits in 2006, that is, only in time of economic growth and long after accession to the EU was well established.

Spain is quite similar to Portugal. We find a positive relation between national identity and EU attitudes both in 1994 and 2006 (although the statistical significance of the relation is greater in 2006, as expected). This positive effect persists even when we take into consideration perception of country benefits, although the association somewhat weakens. Exclusive national identity has a negative effect in EU attitudes; but, particularly in 2006, that effect weakens when we take into board perceptions of county benefits.

In summary, in both net beneficiary countries, the effect of national identity seems clearly influenced by the perception that the country benefits from membership of the EU (more clearly so in the case of Portugal than in Spain). Also, as stated in our hypotheses, the association between national identity and EU attachments seem somewhat more significant in 2006 than in 1994, less than a decade after accession only a couple of years after the approval of the cohesion funds.

We now summarize our hypotheses and results. The positive relationship between national identity and EU attachment is far more obvious in net beneficiary countries than in the net contributor ones and it seems far more influenced by the perception of benefit in the second group of countries than in the first. So, one first tentative conclusion is that budgetary transfers seem to strengthen positive attitudes towards the EU more than other type of economic benefits. The exception is the Netherlands in 1994. The expectation that a more positive relation between national identity and attachment to the EU would exist in 2006 holds only for the southern European countries (in fact it is just the opposite in the case of the Netherlands) and this is probably due to the fact that in 2006 the benefits coming from EU funding was more clear to the Portuguese and Spanish Public Opinion than in 1994 (and the positive effect exists in both points in time). Exclusive national identity has negative effect in EU attitudes in the four countries, but using Garry and Tilley expression the two Iberian

countries (more clearly so in the Portuguese case) “swallow their national pride” in order to benefit from membership to the EU.

Table 5: Regression models in Spain <sup>a</sup>.

	1994				2006			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	A1	A2	B1	B2
Gender	-0,066 (0,184)	0,084 (0,232)	-0,065 (0,188)	0,043 (0,239)	-0,100 (0,215)	0,082 (0,283)	-0,175 (0,212)	-0,041 (0,276)
Age	-0,005 (0,007)	0,001 (0,009)	-0,006 (0,007)	0,002 (0,009)	-0,012 (0,008)	-0,001 (0,011)	-0,010 (0,008)	0,000 (0,010)
Studies (years of)	0,032 (0,019)	0,045 (0,023)	0,020 (0,020)	0,030 (0,024)	0,001 (0,005)	-0,001 (0,006)	0,000 (0,005)	-0,001 (0,006)
Occupation <sup>b</sup>								
Student	0,300 (0,371)	0,480 (0,478)	-0,105 (0,375)	0,186 (0,476)	-0,118 (0,486)	0,074 (0,628)	-0,306 (0,487)	-0,066 (0,618)
Unemployed	-0,245 (0,344)	-0,248 (0,432)	-0,322 (0,352)	-0,344 (0,439)	-0,360 (0,470)	-0,541 (0,610)	-0,619 (0,468)	-0,629 (0,613)
Retired	-0,337 (0,319)	-0,447 (0,420)	-0,292 (0,325)	-0,466 (0,430)	0,258 (0,331)	0,279 (0,465)	0,028 (0,337)	0,101 (0,460)
Skilled Manual Worker	0,003 (0,484)	-0,495 (0,638)	-0,342 (0,485)	-0,913 (0,651)	0,651 (0,399)	0,881 (0,551)	0,309 (0,392)	0,559 (0,520)
Other Manual Worker	0,256 (0,411)	0,143 (0,529)	0,085 (0,419)	0,062 (0,539)	0,768 (0,714)	0,734 (0,925)	0,661 (0,712)	0,596 (0,911)
Desk and services	-0,199 (0,326)	-0,032 (0,417)	-0,391 (0,330)	-0,148 (0,420)	0,682 (0,342)	0,727 (0,457)	0,463 (0,339)	0,570 (0,449)
Farmer/ Fisherman	0,405 (0,984)	0,159 (1,249)	0,991 (1,268)	0,561 (1,572)	0,281* (0,753)	0,181 (0,994)	0,434 (0,773)	0,291 (1,039)
Shopowner/ craftsmen	0,089 (0,368)	0,117 (0,457)	0,105 (0,385)	0,088 (0,473)	0,378 (0,557)	0,395 (0,771)	0,036 (0,542)	0,014 (0,688)
Middle Management General	0,350 (0,385)	0,849 (0,462)	0,107 (0,392)	0,660 (0,470)				
Management/ Professionals	0,021 (0,404)	0,475 (0,487)	-0,236 (0,402)	0,134 (0,484)	0,478 (0,477)	0,318 (0,617)	0,249 (0,478)	0,180 (0,610)
Economic situation	<b>0,266**</b> <b>(0,087)</b>	0,047 (0,111)	<b>0,260**</b> <b>(0,088)</b>	0,056 (0,113)	0,153 (0,147)	-0,113 (0,196)	0,144 (0,147)	-0,129 (0,195)
Financial situation	<b>0,295**</b> <b>(0,112)</b>	0,239 (0,142)	<b>0,261*</b> <b>(0,113)</b>	0,207 (0,144)	0,212 (0,182)	-0,006 (0,239)	0,128 (0,181)	-0,027 (0,236)
Ideology	-0,071** (0,039)	-0,023 (0,048)	-0,041 (0,039)	0,014 (0,049)	0,011 (0,052)	0,052 (0,071)	0,054 (0,052)	0,092 (0,069)
National Identity (pride)	<b>0,731**</b> <b>(0,242)</b>	<b>0,681*</b> <b>(0,317)</b>			<b>1,329***</b> <b>(0,286)</b>	<b>1,172**</b> <b>(0,369)</b>		
Exclusive Nationality			<b>-1,047***</b> <b>(0,174)</b>	<b>-0,941**</b> <b>(0,222)</b>			<b>-1,037***</b> <b>(0,188)</b>	<b>-0,634*</b> <b>(0,250)</b>
Country Benefit		<b>2,696***</b> <b>(0,230)</b>		<b>2,656***</b> <b>(0,233)</b>		<b>3,261***</b> <b>(0,282)</b>		<b>3,225***</b> <b>(0,278)</b>
Constant	-1,808 (0,754)	-3,093 (0,964)	-0,508 (0,750)	-1,912 (0,940)	-0,811 (0,887)	-2,744 (1,163)	0,992 (0,840)	-1,325 (1,091)
X <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	66,810 (17)	232,645 (18)	95,313 (17)	255,505 (18)	57,197 (17)	233,48 (18)	63,44 (18)	229,34 (18)
- 2 Log	944,808	634,824	916,404	615,319	683,56	433,88	686,52	446,14

<sup>a</sup> The data reflect multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Typical errors in brackets. Statistic significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*  $p < 0,05$ ; +  $p < 0,1$

<sup>b</sup> The reference category is Responsible for ordinary HH.

Source: eurobarometers 42 and 66.1

#### **4. Conclusions.**

Under what conditions does national identity have a positive –or negative- effect on preferences over European integration? Drawing on the concept of *double allegiance* (De Vries and van Kersbergen 2007) we have looked at this association in four countries: two net contributor countries (Germany and the Netherlands) and two net beneficiary countries (Spain and Portugal), in two different points in time: 1994 and 2006. The positive relationship between national identity and EU attachment is far more obvious in net beneficiary countries than in the net contributor ones and it also seems more influenced by the perception of benefit of the country membership in the EU. So, one first tentative conclusion is that budgetary transfers seem to strengthen positive attitudes towards the EU more than other type of economic benefits. The exception is the Netherlands in 1994. Exclusive national identity has negative effect in EU attitudes in the four countries, but again this effect changes in the two Iberian countries when the perception of country benefit is taken into account.

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